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Just world research has found that high just world observers
will derogate innocent victims in order to maintain their belief in a just world. How such individuals react when victimized themselves, however, has not been investigated. The present study examined the relationship between belief in a just
world (BJW) and mood change after subjects were exposed to an
innocent victim within i. empathy-inducing and traditional
observer conditions.
The learned helplessness model of depression emphasizes the
role of perception of noncontingency in depression. Following
from this model, it was hypothesized that high JW subjects,because of their higher need to perceive contingency, would experience greater depressed mood change when asked to empathize
with an innocent victim in a helpless situation.
127 female undergraduates were divided into high, medium and
low BJW groups and completed the following pre-measures: l)
rating of the '^average female college student" along 15 bipolar adjectives; 2) Depression Adjective Check List (DACL);
and 3) Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL). Subjects
then read either observer or empathy-inducing instructions
prior to a 5—minute audiotape of a policeman and an innocent
female victim who reports receiving a series of threatening
phone calls. Post measures were: l) adjective rating of the
victim; 2) DACL; 3) MAACL; 4) attribution scale and 5) Likert
item measuring expectation of future noncontingency.
Analysis of variance results for a 3 (high, medium and
low BJW) by 2 (observer/empathy) by 2 (pre-post) design indicated a significant overall derogation effect. For all mood
measures (anxiety, hostility, depression) there were highly
significant increases after exposure to the tape manipulation. However, differences between levels of BJW were not
found for derogation or mood measures. There was no differential mood change between observers and empathizers. The
attribution scale was not found to be a meaningful measure of
the universal/personal attribution for helplessness dimension.
These results are compared to those reported in the current
literature on just world and empathy research. The results
are also discussed in relation to a similar study which used
a male population.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Motivation and desire for personal effectiveness and
control over important life events occupies a well-acknowledged position in viewing the individual human situation
within clinical and social psychological theory and research
(Brehm, 1966; Burger & Cooper, 1979; Kelley, 1971; Langer,
1975; Lerner, 1970, 1977;f Walster, 1966; Wortman, 1975,
1976; Wortman & Brehm, 1975).

The perception of an order-

ly relationship between behavior and outcomes is essential
to effective coping (Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Seligman, 1975),
enabling the individual to set goals and impose some type
of meaningful order on the world (Lerner, 1977; Lerner &
Miller, 1978).
Thus, as the perception of control is considered a
beneficial experience for the animal or human (Burger &
Arkin, 1980; Kelley, 1971); lack or loss of control is
seen as both undesirable and debilitating (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975; Wortman & Brehm, 1975).
Negative reactions to loss of control have been found as a
generalized phenomenon not only in relatively artificial
settings (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Hiroto, 1974; Overmier &
Seligman, 1967), but also in more realistic situations
involving reactions to success and failure (Kuiper, 1978;
1
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Luginbuhl, Crowe & Kahan, 1975) and the effects of victimization on observers and victims (Lerner, 1970, 1971a;
Walster, 1966).
Evidence of a control motivation (Kelley, 1971; Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980) has been found in perceived control phenomena (Langer, 1975) and in general attributional
biases in efforts to maintain control over the environment
(Kelley, 1971-; Miller & Norman, 1975).
People minimize the role of chance' in producing various outcomes, exaggerate the relationship between their behavior and "uncontrollable" life events, and tend to be unaware of the extent to which their behavior
is controlled by external factors. (Wortman,
1975, p. 43).
For example, in games of chance gamblers will behave
as if they have expectations of control (Langer, 1975).
In fact, people often fail to differentiate between chance
and skill situations.

Langer refers to the tendency to

perceive causal relationships when contingency does not in
fact exist as the "illusion of control".

In a sense, such

biases are complementary to the biases of helpless individuals who have learned to underestimate personal
effectiveness (Seligman, 1975).
The perception of control is beneficial and adaptive for'
the organism (Kelley, 1971; Seligman, 1975).

Subjects rated

exposure to unpredictable aversive stimuli less negatively
if lead to believe they had control, that did those
correctly perceiving the situation as uncontrollable, and
showed no subsequent performance deficit (Glass & Singer,
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1972). Furthermore, research indicates that individuals
prefer self-control (Pervin, 1963) and if allowed to control
aversive outcomes, will in fact rate the experience as less
aversive than if administered by the experimenter (Geer &
Maisel, 1972; Wortman, 1975).

Lefcourt (1976) concludes

that prediction and control of aversive stimuli decreases
negative response.
Desire for Control and Causal Attributions
Kelley (1971) links man's need to predict and control
to man's inferences about the causes of observed behavior.
The purpose of causal analyses - the function it serves for the species and the individual - is effective control. The attributor is not simply an attributor, a seeker
after knowledge. His latent goal in gaining knowledge is that of effective management of himself and his environment. He
is not a pure "scientist," then, but an
applied one. (p. 22)
This assertion receives support from findings that
deprivation of control leads to increased attributional
activity (Pittman & Pittman, 1980).
Causal attributions, however, are influenced by the
need to believe one is able to control the environment
(Langer, 1975), and in this way introduce biases into
causal inferences (Kelley, 1971).

Pancer (1980) .identified

attributions for success and failure along a stability/modifiability continuum, "ability" being stable and "effort"
a more controllable factor.

The greater need to perceive

control over performance outcomes and importance of
the task lead to. more attributions made to controllable
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causes (effort).
To the extent to:..which attributions are bases for
future control attempts, individuals will attribute success
to personal factors and failure to external forces (Kelley,
1971) and overestimate their degree of control over random
events (Langer, 1975; Wortman, 1975). Conversely, control
motivation theory suggests one is apt to underestimate the
extent to which behavior is controlled by external factors.
Indeed, evidence indicates actors will exaggerate personal
control and deny situational constraints (Miller & Norman,
1975).
Individual Differences in Desire for Control
Evidence supports the existence of individual

differ-

ences in motivation for control and attributional style
(Burger & Cooper,* 1979; Pittman & Pittman, 1979).
Rotter (1966) developed the Internal-External Locus
of Control scale to measure the degree to which

an individ-

ual believes reinforcements are contingent upon his behavior.
Within his social learning theory, perceived control is operationally defined as a generalized expectancy for internal
rather than external control of reinforcements (Lefcourt,
1976). Those internally oriented perceive both positive
and negative events as a consequence of one's actions and
behavior, thus, under personal control.

Conversely, those

who exhibit an expectancy of external control would see
similar events as unrelated to one's
of one's control (Rotter, 1975).

behavior and out
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Burger and Cooper (1979) developed a paper, and
pencil personality measure of the "general desire for control over the events in one's life" (p. 382). The Desirability for Control construct was hypothesized to account
for some of the variation in learned helplessness reactions
(Burger & Arkin, 1980).

The researchers found that those

subjects high in the desire for control (DC) display greater
cognitive and affective deficits in response to helplessness
training than low DC subjects.
More generally, the authors suggest that to the extent
that the person has a high desire for control, he -will react
more strongly than low DC persons to loss of control and1
may be more susceptible to learned helplessness (Burger &
Cooper, 1979j Pittman &. Pittman, 1980).
High DC individuals are described as assertive, decisive, and active.

High DC subjects were found to exhibit

the illusion of control phenomenon in a chance situation,
whereas low DC subjects did not (Burger & Cooper, 1979).
In a similar vein, Rubin & Peplau (1973) created the
Belief in a Just World Scale based on Lerner's (1970) just
world hypothesis which states that people are motivated to1
believe that they will get what they deserve and likewise,
deserve what they get.

Those high in belief in a just

world have been shown to react differentially in situations
which disconfirm their belief in a contingent world to
those not suscribing to this belief (Milier, 1977j Rubin &
Peplau, 1973). A more extensive examination of this construct
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will be provided in later sections of this review.
Reactions to Uncontrollable Life Events
Walster (1966) notes with realism that "people have
no real control over many of the things that happen to
them" (p. 73), for such reasons as limitations in abilities,
chance factors or external forces (Wortman & Brehm, 1975) .
Congruent with previous discussion, people will
exaggerate their influence over uncontrollable life events
(Wortman, 1976). Further evidence suggests that individual
victims of unfortunate circumstances may even blame themselves
for their fate tather than admit to chance factors. Indirect
evidence comes from studies of guilt in innocent victims
such as cancer patients (Abrams & Finesinger, 1963), parents
of terminally ill children (Chodoff, Friedman & Hamburg,
1964), victims of natural disasters (Lifton, 1963) and
women who have been raped (Medea & Thompson, 1974).
Acknowledgment that unfortunate circumstances may
befall a person through no fault of his own.may present
an extremely unpleasant thought (Lerner, 1970, 1971a). In
some cases, a person is more able to feel he could avert
future misfortune by assigning causal responsibility
(Walster, 1966) or perceiving the situation as having been
caused by his own prior mistakes, behaviors or intentions
(Lerner, 1970).
While some theorists emphasize the nonfunctional
nature of self-blame (Abrams &. Finesinger, 1963) and effects
of such an attribution on self-esteem (Comer & Laird,
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1975; Wortman & Brehm, 1975), others (Chodoff, Friedman
& Hamburg,. 1964) point to the defensive purpose of selfblame in denying that suffering.is impersonal and meaningless.

Medea and Thompson (1974) discuss self-blame as

a means of providing an illusion of safety in anticipation
of future situations.

Bulman and Wortman (1977) suggest

that self-blame may be less painful than admitting to a
random world.

In sum, these studies raise the question

as to whether the illusion of control is adaptive or dysfunctional for the individualr(Langer, 1975).

Little actual research has been carried out which
specifically explores attributional explanations of victims
of unfortunate life events and subsequent affective reactions mediated by different attributions (Lerner & Miller,
1978; Wortman, 1976). Several researchers have questioned
the interaction of personality dispositions in attributions
for uncontrollable events (Comer & Laird, 1975; Wortman,
1976).
The present research project represents an attempt
to address this issue 1) by examining the relationship between the strength of control motivation and reaction to
exposure to uncontrollable outcomes, and 2) by measuring
variation in subsequent affective responses due to differential involvement and attributional mediators.
The remainder of this review will discuss the reformulated learned helplessness model of depression
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(Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978), and focus centrally
on the just world theory (Lerner, 1977) and the convergence
of these theories in explaining affective reaction to the
perception of noncontingency in cases of unjust suffering.
Learned Helplessness Model of Depression
A person or animal is helpless with respect to some outcome when the outcome
occurs independently of all his voluntary responses "(Seligman, 1975, p. 17).
Learned helplessness theory was ignited by studies
(Overmier & Seligman, 1967$ Seligman & Maier, 1967) which
investigated the relationship of fear conditioning and
instrumental learning.

Naive dogs were able to learn, when

placed in a shuttle box, to escape
barrier.

shock by jumping over a

However, animals exposed initially to inescapable

shock did not master the escape task and displayed passive
acceptance of aversive shock.

Such failure to initiate

further responding when the environment was again controllable
exemplifies the motivational deficit engendered in learned
helplessness reactions (Seligman, 1975).

Similar results

have been replicated in'."cats, rats, mice, birds, primates,
fish, cockroaches and man" (p. 28).
Hiroto (1974) utilized Seligman's experimental paradigm
with humans, successfully producing motivational and cognitive deficits associated with learned helplessness effects.
College students were exposed to pre-treatments of controllable or uncontrollable aversive noise prior to an escapeavoidance

learning task.

The uncontrollable

noise
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group exhibited passivity in the subsequent controllable situations, suggesting that they expected future outcomes to be
uncontrollable.

Such lack of initiative in responding leads

to cognitive deficits, where failure to test new contingencies impedes learning that new tasks may be controllable.
Additional studies with humans (Hiroto & Seligman, 1975;
Miller & Seligman, 1975) provide further support for a
learned helplessness theory of depression.
From accumulated research, Seligman (1975) formulated
the learned helplessness theory to encompass both animal and
human data regarding exposure to uncontrollability:
This, then is our theory of helplessness:
the expectation that an outcome is independent of responding (1) reduces the motivation to control the outcome; (2) interferes with learning that responding controls
the outcome; and, if the outcome is traumatic,
(3) procudes fear for as long as the subject
is uncertain of the uncontrollability of the
outcome, and then produces depression, (p. 55-56)
Note that it is the expectation of future helplessness
and not merely exposure to noncontingency, that is critical
in producing motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits.
A measure of expectation of future noncontingency was
included in the hypotheses tested in

the present research.

Miller and Seligman (1973) found that individuals
scoring high on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) did
not utilize information from a skill task to make better
prediction of future success, leading the authors to conclude that the individual perception of noncontingency between acts and outcomes is a significant variable in de-
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pression.

Seligman (1975, 1978) has proposed his theory to

be primarily relevant to reactive types of depression.
Dissatisfaction with Learned Helplessness Theory (1975)
Wortman and Brehm (1975) have pointed out inadequacies
in Seligman*s theory and put forth a combination of reactance
theory and learned helplessness theory to achieve a better
explanation of existing data.
Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) asserts that individuals
will respond to perceived attempts to restrict their personal control with increased motivation to reassert control.
To the extent that an individual has an expectation of behavioral freedom in a particular situation, he will react
differentially to uncontrollable outcomes (Wortman & Brehm,
1975).

Similarly, the degree of threat is related to the

level of reactance.
Wortman and Brehm cite several areas of difficulty
within learned helplessness research, such as methodological
and interpretational difficulties, and more importantly,
evidence that subjects exposed to helplessness training may
actually become more controlling or show facilitation
effects (Hanusa & Schultz, 1977; Roth & Bootzin, 1974; Tennen
& Eller, 1977; Wortman, 1976).
In response, they propose an integrative viewpoint
which takes into account the extent to which a person expects
to be able to control important events.

For those with a

high expectation of control, experience with uncontrollable
outcomes should at first motivate attempts to reestablish
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control as a response to the threat of loss of.
control.

The magnitude of the threat is proportional to

the importance of the outcome, a point ignored in Seligman's
theorizing.

Those people with no expectation of control

•will not be, motivated to exert control, becoming helpless
more quickly.

Thus, the greater reactance, the greater

persistence in the face of uncontrollable outcomes•
Most notable, however, Wortman and Brehm raise the :'■
issue of types of attributions which an individual can make
for the cause of

his

helplessness and their effects.

They hypothesize that attributions of failure to unchangeablefactors such as personal or internal characteristics will
increase resultant feelings of helplessness more than external attributions.
Other critiques have expressed dissatisfaction with
learned helplessness theory and its supporting evidence
(Blaney, 1977; Buchwald, Coyne & Cole, 1978; Costello, 1978;
Rizley, 1978).

More recent literature has emphasized cog-

nitive factors in helplessness-induced depression (Huesman,
1978; Rizley, 1978), and several reformulations based on
attributional analyses and alternate explanations of learnedhelplessness phenomena have been proposed (Abramson, Seligman
& Teasdale, 1978; Hanusa $< Schulz, 1977; Roller & Kaplan,
1978; Miller & Norman, 1979; Pittman & Pittman, 1980;
Roth, 1980; Zuroff, 1980).
Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale's Reformulation
Seligman and his co-authors acknowledge their own
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dissatisfaction -with early learned helplessness theory.
They respond with an outline of inadequacies which they
address systematically through an attributional framework.
"In brief, we argue that when a person finds that he is
helpless, he.asks why he is helpless" (p. 50). Causal
attributions are a determining factor in the generality
and chronicity of learned helplessness deficits.
Previous models have considered uncontrollability to
be defined as response-outcome independence (Seligman, 1975).
Yet such a definition fails to distinguish instances when
an individual does not possess an efficacious response, but
when others around him do, from cases in which all individuals
lack a controlling response (Klein, Fencil-Morse & Seligman,
1976; Kuiper, 1978).
For illustration, consider the following examples:
Case 1: Spring melt and heavy rains have combined to
threaten flooding of a residential section of town. In
spite of Mr. Jones' and his neighbors' efforts to sandbag,
extensive water damage results to his home.
Case 2; In another part of town, Mr. Smith's newly-remodeled
basement is also standing in several inches of water.
Despite his attempts to remedy the situation, this is the
third time his basement has been flooded as a result of his
of incompetency in installing the plumbing in the new
basement,
Note that in both cases, flooding.and damage occurs
independently of Mr„ Jones' or Mr. Smith's responses.
Yet, in the first case, neither Mr. Jones nor anyone else
can control the flooding.

As for Mr. Smith, while he is

unable to prevent his flooding problem, presumably someone
more knowledgeable about plumbing would be able to.
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As events are perceived as noncoritingent, causal
attributions for this state of affairs leads to differential expectations for future response-outcome relationships,
determining the chronicity, generality and intensity of
helplessness deficits (Abramson5et.al., 1978). The reformulation would'classify case 1 as an example of "universal
helplessness".

Since flooding is as.''likely to happen to

Mr. Jones as to his neighbors, he is likely to attribute
causes to external factors. On the other hand, Mr. Smith
exemplifies "personal helplessness". "Outcomes are more or
less likely to happen to themselves" (p. 52) than to others,
suggesting Mr. Smith would attribute to internal or personal
factors that his basement is flooded.

One would expect,

then, that the differential attributions would produce
different helplessness deficits. "Since 'I* is something
that I have to carry around with me, attributing the cause
of helplessness internally often, but not always implies
a grimmer future than attributing the cause externally"
(p. 56). While both types of helplessness situations may
produce cognitive and motivational deficits, findings indicate self-esteem deficits occur only in cases of personal
helplessness (Abramson, 1977; Garber & Hollon, 1980).
Assessment of this attributional variable will be included
in the hypotheses o£ the present research project.
Initial learned helplessness theory (1975) offered
little insight or explanation as to why helplessness deficits
may generalize to either broad or narrow- ranges of new
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controllable situations, or why differences in duration
of helplessness effects occur.

The authors introduce the

dichotomy of stable/unstable attributions as a way of explaining whether effects will be long-term or transient
(Abramson. et al. , 1978).

This distinction meshes nicely

with other attributional analyses in the literature which
utilize four attributional categories: 1) ability, in this
framework an internal-stable attribution;'2) effort, internalunstable; 3) task difficulty, external-stable; and 4) luck,
external-unstable (Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest &
Rosenbaum, 1971). To complete the framework, attributions
may be classified along a global/specific continuum, where
global attributions promote generalization of deficits to
a wide variety of outcomes, and specific attributions will
affect only situations closely related to the original
(Abramson et al, 1978).
Overall, then,.\internal, stable and global attributions
promote most significant deficits with generalization to a
wider variety of situations (Coyne, Matalsky & Lavelle, 1980;
Miller & Norman, 1979) and extend longer into the future.
Additionally, perceived importance has been shown to be
related to degree of deficits (Bachus, 1979).

Support for

attributional mediators in the 1978 reformulation has appeared
in recent literature (Abramson, 1978; Raps, Reinhard & Seligman, 1978). Seligman (1978) defends the consistency of such
a model of depression in that depressives and non-depressives
made helpless show similar deficits (Price, Tryon £< Raps,1978).
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Attributions for Failure and Success
Several researchers (Bradley, 1978j Miller & Ross,
1975) have examined evidence for self-serving biases in
attributions for causality.

Findings suggest that individ-

uals wi^l accept responsibility for success (internal attribution), acknowledging such factors as ability or skill.
However, in circumstances of failure, individuals will tend
to attribute their fate to external factors beyond their
control, thus, avoiding blame and decreasing .responsibility .
in a self-protective manner (Kuiper, 1978; Larson, 1977;
Luginbuhl, Crowe & Kahan, 1975).

This pattern of attribu-

tions for failure and success serve to enhance feelings of
control (Kelley, 1971).
In a review of the research in this area, Miller and
Ross (1975)

found evidence of a self-enhancement bias for

success, but only equivocal evidence for a self-protective
motivation in attributions for failure.

Zuckerman (1979)

suggests that evidence that individuals tend to accept
credit for success and deny failure is mediated by the need
to maintain self-esteem. When self-esteem needs are aroused,
evidence for self-serving biases is strong (Larson, 1977).
Bradleyj(1978) also found support for defensive attributions
when the variables of choice, ego involvement and public
versus private attributions were taken into account.
Self-defeating Biases
It would appear that depressives tend to attribute
failure to internal factors (Comer & Laird, 1975; Klein,
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Fencil-Morse & Seligman, 1976; Miller & Norman, 1979; Tennen
& Eller, 1977), suggesting a self-defeating bias rather than
a self-serving bias as found in normal populations.

Such a

characteristic attributional style would facilitate deficits
as outlined in the Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale reformulation.

Evidence is supportive that depressives generally

attribute failure to internal, global and stable traits
(Hammen.& Krantz, 1976; Klein et al., 1976; Rizley, 1978)
and success to external and specific factors•

Rizley found

depressives tend to over-attribute causality to the self.
Klein et al. were able to demonstrate that depressives exhibited greater performance deficits when attributing failure
internally than externally.
These trends, then, are congruent with predicted deficits and attributional mediators outlined in the Abramson,
Seligman and Teasdale 1978 reformulation.

Such individual

differences between attributions of depressives and non-depressives (Comer & Laird, 1975; Kuiper, 1978) are significant
in examining the learned helplessness model of depression.
Emotional Deficits of Learned Helplessness
According to theory, (Abramson.et al., 1978) loss of
a desired outcome or occurence of a negative outcome leads
to affective deficits that do not result from expectation
of uncontrollable success.

Evidence is supportive of this

distinction (Griffith, 1977).
Gatchel, Paulus and Maples (1975) examined mood
correlates of learned helplessness with the use of the
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Multiple Affect Adjective Cheek List, "After exposure
to inescapable noise, as in the Hiroto and Seligman (1975)
experiment^ subjects exhibited mood changes similar to
symptoms found in characteristics of depression.

Inescap-

able noise subjects rated themselves as more depressed,
anxious and hostile following helplessness trials:. Griffith
(1977) sho-wed that noncontingent failure changes mood in the
direction towards depression, while exposure to uncontrollable success effected changes away from depression.

Other

studies have examined high and low helplessness subjects,
finding high helpless subjects to be more depressed, and
low helpless subjects more hostile (Pittman & Pittman, 1979).
Evidence of mood change has been criticized (Buchwald,
Coyne & Cole, 1978; Wortman, 1976) for being nonspecific
in relation to actual depression, as well-, as for the transiency
of such effects.
Nevertheless, evidence of increased emotionality has
been cited as support for a model of reactive depression
in man (Miller & Seligman, 1975; Seligman, 1978).

Reactive

depression is rooted in feelings of loss of control over
outcomes (Seligman, 1975).

Miller and Norman (1979) des-

cribe the chronology of reactive depression within an
attributional view.

As an individual is exposed to

noncontingent negative outcomes, causal attributions shift
from external, variable and specific to internal, stable
and general attributions.

As this shift affects future

expectancies, deficits occur which sustain this maladaptive
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attributional style and actual success is disregarded.
Researchers and clinicians, however, have been quick
to question the relevancy of learned helplessness to clinical
depression, highlighting the many definitional difficulties
in depressive disorders (DePue & Monroe, 1978). Thus, while
advocates put forth learned helplessness theory as having
potential in clarifying the nature of depressive disorders,
complexities remain (Huesman, 1978).
Seligman (1978) justifies examination of mild depression
as a widespread problem in its own right and treats helplessness depression as a subclass of depression.

He heartily

encourages further and more definitive research with
clinical populations.

The present research will focus on depressed mood
reactions to uncontrollable life events, representing a
subset of learned helplessness situations in which uncontrollable outcomes are primarily chance-determined rather
than skill oriented.
In a related vein, Lerner (1970, 1977) suggests that
one way of coping with the presence of a chance-determined
environment is to actively maintain a belief that the world
is in fact just.
The Just World Hypothesis
Consider reading a daily newspaper.

Within it are

many examples of undeserved suffering: a hit—and—run accident; an innocent child abused; factory layoffs; cancer
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patients without cures; communities devastated by wind or
water.
We do not want to believe that these things
can happen, but they do. At least we do not
want to believe they can happen to people
like ourselves - good decent people. If
these things can happen, what is the use of
struggling, planning and working to build
a secure future for one's self and fjamily?
No matter how strongly our belief in an
essentially just world is threatened by
such incidents, most of us try to maintain
it in order to continue facing the irrita-'
tions and struggles of daily life. This is
a belief we cannot afford to give up if we
are to continue to function. (Lerner, 1970,
p. 207)
The occurence of such unforeseen and unpleasant circumstances to acquaintances or even strangers produces a conflict between admitting to injustice or assuming the
unfortunate person in some manner deserved the consequences.
Just world research examines the variety of ways in which
people attempt to maintain their belief in a just world.
In a recent review of just world literature (Lerner &
Miller, .1978) Lerner acknowledged the roots of his theory
in the observation that individuals tend to resent victims
of circumstance and may in fact blame them for their own
fates.

He suggests that this may be due to the desire to

believe one lives in a just world, a world in which we can
get what we deserve and deserve what we get (Lerner, 1970,
1977; Lerner, Miller & Holmes, 1976)„

His theory represents

a social psychological approach to the perception of contingency and effectiveness in one's environment, perhaps a
more common sense understanding of issues similar to those
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raised within the learned helplessness literature.
Early research employed laboratory recreations of
just world situations.

In his initial study, Lerner (1965)

sought to measure this need of observers to see a fit between outcomes for a particular individual and his personal
worth.

Briefly, subjects observed two students who drew

randomly for a cash prize.

Results indicated that subjects

tended to see the winner of the draw as having worked harder
to deserve his prize than had the loser, in spite of personal
preferences (rated attractiveness) for a particular student.
Belief in a just world implies a personal perception
of deservingness, a distinct relationship between what happens to a person and his behavior, a response-outcome
contingency.

When a person is exposed to injustice in his

environment, then, as in the examples in the newspaper,
such an obvious inconsistency will be threatening.

An

arbitrary world is both unpredictable and frightening in
its implications that a person is no longer able to control
his rewards and punishments by means of his own actions
(Rubin & Peplau, 1973).
A person motivated to maintain this belief in a just
world in spite of evidence to the contrary may restore
contingency and alleviate his anxiety in one of two basic
types of cognitive -justificationst 1) attempt to compensate
the victim (Lerner, 1970; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lincoln
& Levinger, 1972); or 2) derogate the victim, thereby reestablishing a fit between behavior and deservingness
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(Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Rubin & Peplau, 1973; Shaw &
Skolnick, 1971; Walster, 1966).
With this general overview in mind, the basis for
such a justice motive will be addressed, followed by a more
extensive review of the just world research findings.
The Justice Motive
Lerner (1977) cites

the common movie theme of the

"good-guys" versus the "outlaws" and their predictable
interactions as evidence that themes of justice and deserving
are "uniquely central, powerful.'and universal in Western
civilization" (p. 4), The "deserving" hypothesis (Lerner,
1977; Lerner, Miller & Holmes, 1976) explains the seemingly
contradictory social behavior regarding people's compassion
or rejection of innocent victims.
Lerner (1977) criticizes social learning theory by
submitting that internalization of cultural norms is inadequate alone to account for the development of a belief in
a just world and focusses additionally on development of the
individual locus of justice. The "personal contract" (Lerner,
1977; Lerner, et al., 1976) evolves as an infant matures
from the "pleasure-pain" stage which is dominated by the
principle of immediate gratification to the more mature
notion of delay of gratification, or the "reality principle".
The child learns to forestall immediate gains in lieu of a
better payoff in the future.

With the help of a stable

environment, the child is able to visualize attainment of
future outcomes which are more desirable and attractive, if
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he is able to endure some amount of frustration in the
present (Lerner, 1977).

This basic idea of "entitlement"

develops with age into a commitment to deserving exnibited
in adulthood, where it may be applied to increasingly broader
areas of living.

"For most people, most of the time, the

personal contract forms the basis of their goal-seeking., and
psychological stability" (p. 6).
With some thought it becomes apparent that observation
of others * success with the personal contract is a means of
evaluating one's own contract.

Preserving justice for others

is a way of preserving justive for oneself.

The more impor-

tant the contract to the individual, the greater motivation
to eliminate threats to it, thus, the need to believe'in
a just world.
Experimental evidence with children's responsiveness
and perception of deserving (Braband & Lerner, 1973) supports
this developmental model.

Long and Lerner (1974) found that

children high on a measure of willingness to delay gratification were more aware and responded to relative deserving in
other children more than those low in this measure, supporting a relationship between commitment to deserving and
ability to delay gratification.
Studies with adults have also found evidence suggesting
people perceive a "norm of deservingness".

Subjects were

more likely to help someone who both needed and deserved
help than to help someone judged as having more than he
deserves (Miller, 1977; Simmons & Lerner, 1968).

However,

when concern for personal deserving become threatened,
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response to the needs of others may be compromised (Lerner
et al., 1976).
Early Studies
Lerner and Simmons (1966) is a prototype experimental
situation in which

a clearly innocent victim is observed

to suffer through no fault of her own.

Female subjects were

asked to observe another "experiment" in which a student
received painful shocks.

They were made aware that the

"victim" had signed up to earn experimental credit just
as they had, only later learning that her participation
would involve strong negative reinforcement for pair-associate learning.

Subjects watched a 10-minute videotape of

the student receiving painful shocks with instructions to
attend to cues indicative of the subject's emotional arousal.
At this point, one group of subjects were given a chance to
help the victim, by voting to assign her to another 10
minutes of strong positive reinforcement, a neutral condition or continued aversive shock.

Of this group, half

were told that the subject would receive positive reinforcement as a result of the vote (known reward), while the other
half were uninformed of the victim's fate (uncertain reward).
Other experimental subjects were not given such an opportunity
to compensate the victim.
In addition, four conditions varied the degree of
observed suffering.

Subjects were lead to believe that

1) the observed event had occurred in the past (past event);
2) the victim's suffering was terminated at the end of the
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observed 10 minutes (end-point); and two conditions constructed to increase perceived suffering, 3) the victim
would undergo another 10 minutes of shocks (mid-point);
and 4) subjects were told that the victim had agreed to
undergo aversive reinforcement very reluctantly, and decided
to go ahead only so the other students could receive credit
for their participation (martyr condition).

All subjects

were subsequently asked to describe the victim's personality
according to 15 highly evaluative bipolar adjective pairs.
This rating was compared against an earlier rating of the
"average female college student" on the same adjectives.
Results indicated that if given the opportunity, subjects compensated the victim by assigning her to positive
rewards.

However, those subjects with no opportunity to

compensate the victim had no choice but to devaluate her
(Lerner, 1971a; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lincoln & Levinger,
1972).

Characterological devaluation, ascribing negative

attributes to a person, implies that person has acted in the
past to make others suffer, and may act so in the future, so
the present suffering may be seen as "deserved" (Lerner, 1974).
As expected, a greater degree of injustice, as in the
mid-point and martyr conditions, resulted in most harsh
derogation.

Further studies have established a relationship

between degree of injustice and severity of derogation (Jones
& Aronson, 1973; Lerner, 1970; Walster, 1966).

Least nega-

tive ratings coincided with the known reward condition, while
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subjects in the uncertain reward condition, despite voting
to compensate the victim, evaluated her negatively.

The

authors suggest that devaluation -will occur when the observer is not reassured that justice has actually been
reestablished.
Condemnation of altruistically motivated victims
(Lerner, 1971a; Lerner & Simmons, 1966,* McDonald, 1977;
Simons & Piliavin, 1972) would seem to contradict common
sense.

Further research by Lerner (1970) examined observers'

reactions to a student who agreed to undergo a condition involving either shock or no shock.

Results indicated

that when observers believed there would be no shock involved the martyr was rated as more attractive than a nonmartyr.

She was rated less attractive when subjects believed

she would suffer yet in the future, suggesting that someone
suffering for altruistic motives is more threatening to a
belief in a just world than someone with less admirable
motivations.
In sum, research suggests that innocent victims will
be devaluated in cases in which 1) the person obviously suffers; 2) the victim is not:compensated for this suffering;
3) the victim has done nothing wrong to merit such a fate
(Cialdini, Kenrick 8* Hoerig, 1976; Kenrick, Reich & Cialdini,
1976; Lerner & Simmons, 1966).
Two Worlds
Despite evidence of a justice motive, societal indifference towards disadvantaged groups is difficult to ignore.
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Lerner (1977) postulates the existence of two worlds to
account for this.

In one, the just world, the personal

contract allows people to organize their behavior towards
their goals.

In the world of victims, however, injustice

predominates and personal contracts are not fulfilled.
Justice theory assumes that citizens of the just world are
at the same time still vulnerable to cues of injustice from
the world of victims.

People would be willing, the theory

goes, to give of themselves for the purpose of regaining a
just world for all.

Yet, to the extent that one can not

remedy all instances of injustice, they will remain vulnerable
to the world of victims.

Hence, people are responsive to

others• needs to the extent that it does not begin to
compromise their personal deservingness (Lerner, 1977).
Beyond that point, indifference or derogation may be the
only means left to deal with such threats to belief in a just
world.
Helping the Victim
Under what conditions, then, will a person be motivated
to help a victim of unfortunate circumstances?

Simmons and

Lerner (1968) found that having been treated unjustly oneself
will increase motivation to assist others in the same situation and decrease willingness to assist a person who has been
"fortuitously benefitted"0

A person whose belief in a just

world has been threatened by his own experiences will try
to create evidence by helping others that the world is in
fact just (Simmons & Lerner, 1968).
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Observers are most -willing to help in cases in "which
suffering can be alleviated most easily, such as an isolated
event or a unique victim (Lerner,. 1977).

They will be more

likely to help an individual rather than a group cause,
and help in a situation that promises to be of short duration as opposed to chronic suffering (Miller, 1977), because
ineffective efforts to help will challenge the person's belief in a just world (Lerner, 1977).

Miller notes further

than individuals possessing a stronger belief in a just world
may feel more responsible for responding to injustice than
those whose belief is weaker.
There is even evidence to suggest that individuals
with a high belief in a just world will behave more deservingly by helping others when they themselves are in a time
of need, such as before finals (Zuckerman, 1975).

This adds

support to Lerner*s theory, suggesting that individuals believe that deserving inputs are rewarded even in cases where
there is no obvious connection between the response and
outcome.
Conditions of Justified Self-interest
A final point of justice theory to be discussed here
concerns deserving and the realistic difficulty in our world
of allocation of resources.

We often follow rules of

"parallel competition" (Lerner, 1977) in which the opportunity
is equally available to all persons to pursue limited resources.

"According to the norms of justified self-interest,

the winner deserves to win - as long as he didn't cheat -
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and it was a 'fair' competition" (p. 19). To test this,
subjects were given a chance to choose between an experimental condition involving shocks and a control condition
with no shocks (Lerner & Lichtman, 1968).

In this case,

subjects who chose the control condition, thereby assigning
a partner to receive shocks, felt no need to derogate the
victim.

Another study (Lerner, 1971b) with males replicated

these findings that even if one causes harm to another, as
long as conditions of investment, risk and opportunity are
equivalent, one can feel justified in acting in one's best
self-interest.

In summary, the research reviewed thus far illustrates
the variety of ways in which people attempt to maintain
their belief in a just world when confronted with injustices.
The person is faced with a conflict in which he must either
become aware that the world may be cruelly injust or arrange
his cognitive constructions and attributions such that "the
only people who suffer in this world are those who deserve
such a fate" (Lerner, 1970, p. 277).

Research findings

would seem to support the latter choice.

Perception of injustice is closely related to attribution of causality or blame, such that maintenance of a perception of deservingness may influence attributions of
causality (Chaikin & Darley, 1973; Lerner, 1965; Simmons &
Lerner, 1968; Walster, 1966).
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Further Conditions of Victim Derogation
A recent review (Lerner & Miller, 1978) outlined
conditions under which observers will devalue or derogate
the "character or personal attributes*' of a victim who has
suffered innocently.
1) If subjects are able to provide behavioral justification on the victim's part for having broughtinjustice
upon himself, it is not perceived as an injustice and presents
less threat (Lerner & Matthews, 1967).

Lerner (1974) reports

a study in which MacDonald (1971) presented subjects with'
a case report of a stabbing incident.

The innocence of the

victim was varied such that in one case she appeared more
behaviorally responsible for her fate than in another.

Results

indicated that she was in fact derogated significantly more
in the condition of less behavioral responsibility.

Thus,

an innocent victim.'is more threatening.
2) A high status or attractive victim is a special
case.

Undeserved suffering of more attractive or respectable

victims may be more threatening due to increased difficulty
in assuming a characterological fault.

In such instances

it may be preferable to individuals to attribute behavioral
responsibility to the victim than to suggest characterological
deficits (Lerner, 1970).
Jones and Aronson (1973) examined such issues in a mock
jury rape case.

Character of the victim was manipulated by

identifying the woman as married, a virgin, or a divorcee.
As expected, jurors assigned the defendant to greater punishment for the rape of a virgin (most respectable) than
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for the rape of a divorcee (least respectable of the three).
At the same.time, however, the virgin was held most behaviorally responsible.
3) As mentioned previously, when the victim and observer are both involved in a situation in which the norm of
justified self-interest can be applied, no derogation is
found (Lerner & Lichtman, 1968, Lerner, 1971b).
4) Lastly, an important variable in determining a
positive or rejecting reaction is identification with the
victim.

When observers believe they themselves may be in a

similar situation as the victim is presently in, they tend
to pay more attention to external causes for suffering,
rather than derogate the victim (Chaikin & Darley, 1973;
Stokols and Schopler, 1973).

The issue of defining identi-

fication and empathy will be discussed shortly.
In sum, observers find it least difficult in an ambiguous situation to ascribe behavioral responsibility,
especially for a respectable victim.

Such an attribution

implies control over future outcomes.

If unable to find

any actions which have lead to unpleasant outcomes, characterological derogation will occur, i.e. "He must have deserved
it." While this attribution may require considerable displacement, it serves to overpower the threat of randomness or
chance, over which one has little control.

"Attribution to

some random 'chance'...would be to deny that its causes
could be understood, making future accidents unpredictable
and therefore unavoidable" (Chaikin & Darley, 1973, p. 274).
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Individual Differences in Belief in a Just World
While research findings generally support just world
theory, individual differences do appear.

Lerner, Miller

and Holmes.. (1976) reported that one third of the subjects
in Lerner and Simmon's (1966) study did not derogate the
victim at all.

Rubin and Peplau (1973) developed the Belief

in a Just World Scale to assess such individual variation
in the construct as earlier defined by Lerner (1970).

They

assumed a measurable dimension which would be predictive of
reactions to victims, whether persons would be more or less
likely to derogate innocent victims.

Similarly, such indi-

viduals scoring high or low in belief in a just world would
have a greater or lesser need to perceive a contingent environment where both good and bad outcomes are always deserved.
Rubin and Peplau made use of the 1971 draft lottery to
test the extent to which high just world (HJW) individuals
would perceive "justice" in randomly chosen winners (high
draft numbers) and losers (low draft numbers).

It was hypo-

thesized that high JW individuals would admire the "winners"
more and evaluate the "losers" as deserving of their fate.
Low JW individuals should not exhibit differential evaluations.

It was further hypothesized that high JW subjects

would experience a drop in self-esteem if they were to "lose".
Results indicated that overall participants were more
sympathetic of losers than winners.

Among high JW subjects,

however, this pattern did not occur.

In fact, they tended

to resent losers more than winners.

While bad versus good

outcomes had an overall effect on self-esteem, it was not
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significantly related to just world scores.

Here is an

instance in which overall derogation of victims was not
upheld, yet taking into account individual differences yielded
predicted effects,for those high in belief in a just world.
Other correlational measures in the same study suggested
just world scores are highly related to belief in God and
inversely correlated with locus of control (high JW individuals score internally). A strong correlation with authoritarianism emphasizes that those high in just world believe
"that strong and powerful people are good, and weak and powerless people are bad" (Sandford, 1971). Lerner, Miller and
Holmes (1976), however, report some earlier unpublished factor
analytic research which indicated that belief in a just world
and authoritarianism measures did not tap the same construct.
Other reported results are supportive of the construct
validity of the Just World scale.

"Responses of people who

were high on the 'Just World Scale* correlated with the belief that people can exercise control over their lives through
effort and self-sacrifice" (Lerner et al., 1976, p. 141).
With the introduction of the Just World scale, just
world research began to examine more closely the relationship
of individual attitudes and reactions to victims (Miller, 1977;
Zuckerman, 1975). In a further discussion and review of just
world theory and research, Rubin and Peplau (1975) affirm
that high JW individuals will express more derogation of
victims than low JW' persons.

From their findings they

describe a high just world person as trusting, authoritarian
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religious (Russell & Jorgenson, 1978; Sorrentino & Hardy,
1974), tending to ascribe to the Protestant ethic (MacDonald,
1972) and generally exhibiting an internal control of reinforcements .

No clear sex differences have been found

(Rubin & Peplau, 1973). Zuckerman and Gerbasi (1977a) have
found high JW individuals to be more trusting, as -would be
expected in that they exhibit more faith in the general
fairness of the world despite evidence to the contrary.
High just world individuals exhibit

trust toward others as

well as towards authority and government.
Lastly, it was hypothesized that personal experience
with injustice may soften belief in a just world , across
the variablesof sex,, age and social class, but evidence to
date has been unable to verify this point (Rubin & Peplau,
1975).
Belief in a Just World and Locus of Control
Several, studies have indicated a relationship between
the belief in a just world construct and internal locus of
control ( Lerner, 1970; Rubin & Peplau, 1973; Zuckerman &
Gerbasi, 1977b). Such a relationship would support Lerner *s
theory that belief in a just world results from a person's
motivation to believe desired reinforcements are under his
control.

A closer comparison of the characteristics of

individuals with a strong belief in a just world and internals
(Rubin & Peplau, 1975), however, found these constructs to be
discrepant, suggesting the relationship is not as clearcut
as originally thought.
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Recent factor analyses of Rotter's Internal-External
Locus of Control Scale (1966) have identified several component factors (Collins,.

1974j Mirels, 1970; Zuckerman & Ger-

basi, 1977c), suggesting it is multidimensional in nature.
Collins (1974) identified four factors, belief in a difficult
world, a just world, a politically responsive world and a
predictable world, which have been replicated in other analyses (Ryckman, Posen & Kuhlberg, 1978; Zuckerman, Gerbasi
& Marion,' 1977) .
Zuckerman and Gerbasi (1977c) noted that just world factor items do incorporate "deservingness", or a contingency
between output and payoff, as well as a control orientation.
Theoretical similarity to personality measures and correlational data indicate this factor taps the same construct
described in just world theory (Lerner, 1970). Internal scores
on the just world factor correlated positively with authoritarianism, dogmatism, intolerance for ambiguity and blaming
women for their inferior state (Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977c).
Such measures have also been shown to relate to high just
world.scale scores.
items, Collins

From additional correlations with new

(1974) found that individuals scoring high on

the just world factor of the I-E scale "believe in a strong
causal relationship between the characteristics of the person
(effort, ability, etc) and what happens to him" (p. 390).
However, Zuckerman and Gerbasi (1977c) and Zuckerman
et al.

(1977) suggest just world factor items are relatively

independent of the other I-E factors, belief in a difficult
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•world, a politically responsive world, and a predictable
world.

Discontinuity between attitude and personality

measures related to the just world construct, such as
religiosity, authoritariansim, respect for social institutions, lack of activism, which are not generally associated
with an internal locus of control lead the authors to conclude, "an apparent inconsistency between a belief in a just
world and a belief in internal control suggest that the
Internal-External just world items

should be replaced"

(Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977c, pc 173).
In conclusion, such factor analyses of the InternalExternal scale have

contributed to the understanding of

the belief in a just world construct.

Yet, findings that

high JW subjects score internally are seriously confounded
by a high loading on the just world factor items which are
inconsistent with a generalized internal locus of control.
Belief in a Just World - Attributions of the Victim
Just world researchers have been concerned with the
broad implications of their findings for attitudes towards
social injustice and political issues (Lerner, 1970, 1977;
Lerner, Miller & Holmes, 1976).

In contrast, the scope

of the present project is examination of implications of
the belief in a just world for the victims of uncontrollable
life events.

How do high just world individuals react

when they are the victims?
Lerner and Miller (1978) have

criticized just world

research methodology for lack of experimental realism and
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involvement, unclear manipulation of behavioral responsibility and innocence of the victim, inadvertent variations
of the victim's state of need or.characterological information and experimental demand characteristics.

The present

study was designed so far as possible to avoid such
criticism and at the same time provide a clear test of the
hypotheses.

For these reasons, this project

used an

example of a victim of a randomly-occuring crime (threatening
phone calls) as the experimental manipulation.
Causal Attribution for Chance Outcomes
Walster (1966) examined the causal attributional
process for accidents and other chance outcomes.

The

greater

severity of an accidental occurence, the greater need of
people to assign responsibility (Phares & Wilson, 1972;
Walster, 1966).
And when we hear of an accident, for the
most part we sympathize with the helpless
victim of fate. Often, however, if we
feel the accident is a serious one.and we
reflect on it at some length, we begin
to have vague feelings that perhaps this
accident was not beyond the victim's
control. (Walster, 1966, p. 73)
Viewing accidents as caused by external factors implies
that such misfortunes could happen to oneself.

Walster

proposes that observers attribute responsibility in a selfprotective manner, attributing increasing.personal responsibility to the actor, or victim. In this way one is protected
against the threatening idea that in the future one could
fall prey to similar chance circumstances (Lerner, 1970;
Walster, 1966).

Note, this is distinguished from the self-
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protective function of external attribution for failure
in a skill-oriented situation as discussed earlier in this
review (Miller & Ross, 1975).
Lowe and Medway (1976) assert that such self-protective attributions that minimize the role of chance for
negative outcomes, as discussed by Walster, will be maximized
when relevance of the situation to the observer and potential
occurence are high, as well as when actual causal data are
left ambiguous.

Furthermore, individuals who tend to endorse

personal factors as causal determinants of their own behavior
attributed more ability and less luck to others for negative
outcomes, and more blame and less favorable traits for more
severe consequences.
These data are compatible with just world data indicating
that high just world individuals, who perceive a close fit
between their behavior and outcomes, attribute personal
responsibility to an innocent victim for his or her fate (Lerner,
1965; Rubin & Peplau, 1973).
Similarly, Sosis (1974) found that people who perceive
themselves as in charge of their own fate tend to project
their internality onto accident victims, judging a victim
as personally responsible for

his fate.

Likewise, internals

attribute more responsibility to others than externals (Phares
& Wilson, 1972).
Shaver,(1970) points out that several studies have
been unable to

replicate Walster*s results (Shaw & Skolnick,

1971; Walster, 1967).

Shaver proposes, instead, that obser-
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vers will attribute misfortunes of others to chance, as a defensive attribution to avoid future blame or responsibility
should the observer ever find himself in a similar situation.
Counter to Shaver, Lerner (1970) sides with Walster
(1966) in the observation that to the extent to which innocent suffering is dissonant with belief in a fair and orderly
world, observers will change their evaluation of the victim
by attributing personal responsibility, creating a fit between behavior or character and the observed outcome.
Attributions of Victims for Negative Uncontrollable Outcomes
From the point of view of the victim, then, these two
theories make differential predictions.
Defensive attribution (Shaver, 1970) would suggest that
a victim would attribute his suffering to chance factors.
"The defensive attribution hypothesis suggests that people
will prefer to believe in a capricious world rather than
believe that they themselves are responsible..." (Chaikin &
Darley, 1973, p. 269), and avoid self-blame for future
misfortunes they may experience.
Within the Lerner paradigm, the control motivation
postulates that a potential victim would attribute negative outcomes to behavioral or characterological factors,
rather than chance factors, as chance is least controllable
of these attributions.

"People make causal attributions in

order to enhance their feelings of control over their environment" (Wortman, 1976, p. 23). Brickman, Ryan and Wortman
(1975)

found support

for

the

tendency

to see

acci-
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dents as controlled by behavioral rather than external
events.

Thus, Lerner and Walster defend a defensive

bias in the victim against viewing accidents as caused
by external or chance factors.
In an experiment examining these two divergent hypotheses (Chaikin & Darley, 1973), severe consequences of an
accident were more likely to be attributed to non-chance
factors than mild consequences, replicating Walster*s (1966)
results.

An accident with mild/severe consequences was

observed by subjects who later thought they would be either
perpetrators or victims in a similar situation.

Perpetrator-

relevant subjects derogated the victim of a severe accident,
whereas victim-relevant subjects did not.

Most important,

however, future victims were more likely to avoid chance
attributions.

By making future situations avoidable, they

acted to avoid future harm, while future perpetrators acted
to avoid future blame.

In a sense, then, support was found

for both theories, suggesting observers and victims may make
different attributions in similar situations.
In this design, however, the accident involved clear
roles of perpetrator and victim, unlike some real life
situations.

Furthermore, since empathy and identification

were confounded to some extent, an articulate picture of
the victim's reaction to the accident was not achieved.
Uncontrollable Life Events
In her discussion of uncontrollable life events,
Wortman (1976) states,"Individuals seem very uncomfortable
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with the notion that such outcomes occur by chance" (p. 38),
suggesting that people would rather blame themselves for
a negative life event than admit to a random environment.
However, few research studies have examined causal attributions for negative life events and conditions under which
victims blame themselves.

^

Most critical, it has remained unclear in the literature whether such control biases and exaggeration of personal
responsibility are adaptive or hinder effective coping by
the individual (Lerner & Miller, 1978; Wortman, 1976).
Bulman and Wortman (1977) examined the causal attributions of spinal cord injury victims for their accidents.
In particular the authors examined the relationship between
causal attribution of blame and subsequent effectiveness of
coping.

Clear relationships emerged between self-blame and

effective coping.

Conversely, external attributions for

the accident was associated with poor coping as rated by
hospital staff.

Bulman and Wortman interpret their findings

as consistent with a need for control in such patients.
Self-blame provided an order to the world and meaning in
suffering in denying the operation of chance.
Obviously such a population is unique, and does not
suggest that self-blame is functional in all cases. In fact,
as previously reviewed, Seligman and his associates (Abramson,
Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975) feel that selfblame and internal or personal attributions for situations
in which a person is helpless may be maladaptive. In their
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recent reformulation (1978) personal and universal
attributions for helplessness were hypothesized to lead to
motivational and cognitive deficits.

Affective deficits

have been related only to attributions of personal helplessness, internal attributions for lack of control

Abramson

et al. characterize depressives as possessing an internal,
stable and global attributional style for failures.

Rizley

(1978) has confirmed that depressives attribute failure
internally and over-attribute causality to the self.
The present study sought to explore the victim's attributions for uncontrollable outcomes and relationship to
subsequent mood change.

Three levels of belief in a just

world (high, medium and low) were compared.

For this research

half of the experimental conditions were asked to observe a
"victim", as in a

typical just world study, and the other

half were given empathy-inducing instructions to facilitate
identification with the victim and her plight.

In this man-

ner, it was assumed that empathic instructions could produce
subjects reactions as similar as possible to those of actual
victims.
Empathy and

Identification with the Victim

Lerner and Matthews (1967) discovered that identification with the victim tends to promote compassion rather than
rejection.

Subjects will not derogate a victim they identi-

fy with (Lerner, 1974).

However, in this context identifi-

cation refers not to similarities in personality, "identification with a victim

requires

the

perception

of

page 42the same possible common fate and not the perception of
similar attributes" (Lerner & Mattews, 1967, p. 324).
Stokols and Schopler (1973) found that anticipation
of future ineraction with the victim served to mitigate
derogation effects.

And some evidence (Chaikin & Darley,

1973) would suggest that potential victims exhibited more
external blame to perpetrators of the situation.

Some

life events outside of the laboratory, however, may not
have obvious perpetrators of injustice.
According to Lerner (1977), identity relationships are
produced through empathic involvement with the observed victim.

Aderman, Brehm and Katz (1974) manipulated empathy with-

in a just world framework.

These experimenters replicated

Lerner and Simmons (1968) study with three sets of instructions, 1) original instructions, 2) "watch her", empathyinhibiting instructions; and 3) "imagine yourself", empathyinducing instructions which encouraged the subject to imagine herself in the place of the victim.

Derogation effects

were found in all but the third condition, suggesting that
empathy inhibits derogation.

Interestingly, though, empa-

thizing observers described their mood as more aggressive
after viewing the innocent victim than other conditions..
Lerner and Miller (1978) suggest that differential
effects may be attributed to the subjects' concern with self
and attention being directed to the experimenter rather
than to the victim.

These explanations are congruent with

the actor-observer hypothesis (Jones & Nisbett, 1971) which
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argues that actors (victims) "will be more likely to
attribute situationally (to external causes) and observers
will attribute dispositionally, to the character of the
person, in inferring causes of observed behavior.
Jones and Nisbett hypothesize that actors and observers'
exhibit differential causal attributions as a result of
differences in the information available to them.

Actors

tend to see situational variables as salient, because being
aware of their own prior history of behavior, they are
aware of inconsistencies and instabilities in themselves.
The observer, however, has less information and may assume
a behavior to be typical of an actor, biasing his attributions in the direction of dispositional. characteristics
(Nisbett, Caputo, Legant & Maracek, 1973).
Regan and Totten (1975) examined whether empathic set
influenced attributions in a similar manner to actor-observer
differences.

The authors hypothesized that an empathic set

would encourage subjects to attribute situationally, rather
than dispositionally for an actor's behavior.
provided support for this hypothesis.

Their results

In empathy conditions,

then, situational aspects of actors became more salient,
whereas non-empathic subjects continued to attribute dispositionally.

They concluded that observers could, in effect,

be turned into actors.
Subsequent research has indicated that empathy induction leads to a sharing of self-enhancing attributional
biases (Miller & Ross, 1975), while standard observers
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attribute dispositionally for both success and failure
(Gould &: Sigall, 1977).
Brehm and Aderman (1977) replicated earlier findings
(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974) that empathy-inducing instructions lead observers to evaluate a victim more favorably
than standard instructions, thus, inducing the actor's
perspective.

Such studies provide the basis for empathy-

based observer-observer differences which can be utilized in
examining reactions of victims by using subjects instructed
to be empathic.
Miller and Norman (1975) found results that were discrepant from actor-observer attributions, however, reporting
that actors accepted more behavioral responsibility and
acknowledged greater disposition in their behavior than
observers•
The tendency for actors to assume responsibility for their behavior and to indicate that their behavior was consistent
with their dispositions, may be seen as
a manifestation of the need of the actor
to perceive himself as exercising effective control. To the extent that actors
allocate responsibility for their behavior to external causal agents (personal
or impersonal), their perceived causal
potency is threatened or reduced, (p. 512)
Miller and Norman's findings suggest that desire for
control and need for contingency in the environment may
mediate attributional processes in the actor.
Recent research has supported this contention (Burger
& Arkin, 1980; Pancer, 1980; Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980),
Individual difference, as measured by the Desirability of
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Control Scale (Burger & Cooper, 1979) in the need to control
life events, produce differential deficits after learned
helplessness training. High DC subjects report more depression than those low in desire for control (Burger & Arkin,
1980.)
These results indicate that individuals
with a high desire to control events in
their lives may be more susceptible to
learned helplessness than are persons
low in this motive. (Burger & Cooper, 1979, p. 391)
Pittman and Pittman (1979, 1980) have also demonstrated
a relationship between a high expectation of control and
performance deficits and depressed mood.

Subjects wil lower

expectancies displayed significantly less marked deficits.
Wortman (1976) has framed this relationship within a
social-psychological perspective, "There is also the possibility that self-blame or devaluation is a response to
uncontrollable outcomes adopted only by people with certain
personality dispositions" (p. 46).
Overview
The present study attempted to show that persons high
in belief in a just world are more susceptible to depressed
mood when they themselves are victims of uncontrollable
life, events (Burger & Arkin, 1980j Burger & Cooper, 1979;
Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980)0

In a manner similar to that

outlined in the Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978)
reformulation of learned helplessness theory, the high
just world individual's need to perceive a contingent world
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should lead him to attribute negative uncontrollable events
to personal or characterological factors before he will
admit to chance factors in his environment and confront
the threatening idea of relinquishing his perception of
control.

Such personal attributions for helplessness are

linked to emotional deficits (depressed mood) within the
re formulat ion.
On the other hand, as demonstrated in the just world
literature (Lerner, 1970, 1977; Lerner & Simmons, 1966),
observers of victims should deal with this threat by
derogating the victim.
To the extent that those low in the need to believe in
a just world are less concerned with a rigidly contingent
environment, exposure to uncontrollability
to be less threatening.

was predicted
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Hypotheses
1) High just world subjects will express more derogation,
of the victim, as measured by a comparison of the adjective
ratings of the "average female college student" with ratings
of the "victim", than low just world subjects.
2) For observer conditions, the amount of derogation will
correlate positively with how much subjects believe the
unjust situation will continue in the future.
3) More depressed mood change pre-test to post-test will
occur in empathy conditions than in observer conditions.
4) Within empathy conditions, high just world subjects will
exhibit more depressed mood change pre-test to post-test
than low just world subjects.
5) Within observer conditions, high just world subjects will
exhibit less depressed mood change from pre-test to
post-test than low just world subjects.
6) Within empathy conditions, a high degree of depressed
mood at post-test will be positively related to strength
of belief in future noncontingency.
7) Within empathy conditions, a high degree of depressed
mood at post-test will be positively correlated with
attributions to personal helplessness.
8) Belief in a just world will correlate
desire for control.

positively with
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CHAPTER II
Methods
General Design
The present study employed two primary variables.
The first, belief in a just -world, was divided into three
levels (high, medium and low thirds) defined statistically
from screening data on the Belief in a Just World Scale.
Across the belief in a just world factor, subjects were
randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions
which varied instructional set.

Half of the subjects re-

ceived empathy-inhibiting (observer condition) instructions
prior to the experimental manipulation.

The remaining half

received empathy-inducing (empathy condition) instructions.
Thus, subjects participated in one of six experimental
conditions according to their level of belief in a just
world and observer or empathy instructional set to which
they were randomly assigned.
Subjects
198 female undergraduate students in introductory
psychology courses at the University of Montana completed
the Belief in a Just World Scale screening measure in class
at the beginning of Winter quarter. Subjects from high,
medium and low thirds of this distribution were later re- .
cruited by phone for participation in the study.

They were

randomly assigned to Observer or Empathy conditions at this
time.

After subject loss due to no-shows and a tape recorder

malfunction which invalidated data from seven subjects,
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complete data was obtained for 130 subjects.
Data from three subjects were subsequently not included
in analyses because of their high level of depressed mood at
pre-test.

Criterion for exclusion was scores on both DACL and

D-MAA.CL depression measures at pre-test which equalled or
exceeded two standard deviations above the mean reported for
a normal college population (Lubin, 1967; Zuckerman & Lubin,
1965).
Correlational analyses included 127 subjects, divided
into 65 observers and 62 empathizers.

Analysis of variance

computations included 108 total subjects.

19 subjects were

randomly discarded from the total 127 to achieve equal cell
sizes of 18 per group.
Subjects earned one hour of experimental credit for
their participation.
Materials
Materials developed for this research included:
1) Cover story - (see Appendix I) A preliminary paragraph described the project as investigating "social observation" and "emotional cues", a composite of background
preparation given by other researchers in similar studies
(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977; Gould
& Sigall, 1977; Lerner & Simmons, 1966).
2) Instructional set - (see Appendix J

and K) Empathy-

inhibiting instructions were modeled after original Lerner
and Simmons (1966) instructions and recent modified versions
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(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977; Gould
& Sigall, 1977) which emphasize an observer role.
inducing

Empathy-

instructions -were developed, from the same sources

as cited above, and encourage the subject to be "empathic"
with the victim.

Both sets of instructions were made

relevant to this particular experimental situation.
3) Case transcript - (see Appendix A ) A transcript of
a woman reporting receiving a series of obscene and threatening phone calls to a police officer was developed from the
"What To Do About Annoying Telephone Calls'' pamphlet distributed by Mountain Bell and from a personal interview with
Al Baker, Missoula City Police Detective in charge of the
Sex Crimes Division.

Specific dialogue was constructed to

produce a learned helplessness-like situation involving an
innocent victim (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Lerner,
1971a).
In this case, receiving these telephone calls (negative
outcome) was portrayed as unrelated or noncontingent upon
the victim's responses,

The interview was ended by the

policeman in a manner suggesting that there would be no easy
solution, in this way facilitating expectation of future
uncontrollability.
From the perspective of just world theory, information
in the dialogue communicated the necessary conditions which
define an innocent victim: 1) the subject is unable to help
the victim, 2) the person obviously suffers, and 3) it is a
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random occurence and unrelated to the victim's objective
behavior.

The information included in the tape did not

readily suggest a behavioral or characterological justification for her suffering.

The transcript -was developed to fit

the above criteria for this study and to be a credible,
although not necessarily typical, example of such a crime.
This transcript was acted out by an age-appropriate
professional actor as the police officer and a female graduate student.

The simulated interview was present to the

subjects as "real".
4) Attributional measure - A 10-item scale was developed
to measure personal (internal) versus universal (external)
attributions for helplessness.

Five items were scored in the

internal direction and five in the external direction, (see
Appendix L) All items were theoretically constructed according to the self-other dichotomy proposed in the Abramson
et al. 1978 learned helplessness reformulation:
When people believe that outcomes are more
or less likely to happen to themselves than
to relevant others, they attribute these
outcomes to internal factors. Alternatively,
persons make external attributions for outcomes that they believe are as likely to
happen to themselves as to relevant others,
(p. 52)
Responses were measured on a 7-point Likert-type
scale with ends anchored with l=Msagree and 7=Agree.

A

factor analysis was computed post-hoc. (see Results section)
5) Strength of expectation of future noncontingency (see Appendix M) Responses to the question, "How many more
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harassing phone calls do you think this woman will continue
to receive after having reported her problem?" were rated
on a 7-point Likert-type scale with ends anchored at l=none
and 7=6 or more.
6) Expectation of, future harm - (see Appendix M)
Responses to the question, "How likely do you think it is that
the caller will do physical harm to the woman?" were rated
on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored at 1 = not likely
and 7 = likely.
7) Level of involvement - (see Appendix M) A question
was designed to check the manipulation of empathy-inhibiting
and empathy-inducing set.

Subjects rated their level of in-

volvement on a 9-point Likert-type scale, with ends anchored
with the statements 1 = "I listened to how this woman reacted
in this situation during the audiotape: and 9 = "I put myself in this woman's place during the audiotape".
8) General Subjective/Objective preference - (see
Appendix M) Subjects were asked their general preference for
viewing a similar situation from an objective or subjective
point of view.

The read the following statement: "If I were

to read an article in the newspaper about someone in a similar situation as this woman I would generally:" and then
checked one of the following statements, "be more concerned
with the facts'! or "consider the woman's point of view".
9) Credibility - (see Appendix M) Subjects rated the
credibility of the •••manipulation on a 9-point Likert-type
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scale, "I feel this was a believable example of women who
receive a series of threatening phone calls", with anchors
1 = No and 9 = Yes.
10) Prior experience with obscene calls - (see Appendix
N)

Subjects were asked if they had ever received any obscene

phone calls and to describe how long they continued and how
many calls they received.

Subjects were also asked if they

had any close relatives or friends who had received such
phone calls.

These questions were included to assess the

possible effects of prior exposure to this type of situation.
Instruments
————————————-

(

Several scales were utilized for screening and pre-post
test comparisons.
1) Belief in a Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1973) (see Appendix C) The original scale used by the authors contained 16 items, 13 of which were used in a new scale with
seven additional new items.

The same authors (1975) reported

internal consistency of .80 with a sample of 180 male and
female college students, with a mean score of 3.08 on a
6-point Likert-type scale anchored with "disagree" and " ■.';
"agree".

A 26-item version used with another college popu-

lation yielded an internal consistency of .81,, with a mean
score of 3.79. Present research utilized the 20-item scale
(Rubin & Peplau, 1975).
2) Desirability for Control Scale (Burger & Cooper,
1979) - (see Appendix D) This 20-item scale was developed to
measure "desire for control over events -in one's environment"
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(p. 383). Responses are rated on a 7-point Likert-type
scale with seven statements ranging from "This statement
doesn't apply to me at all" to "This statement always applies
to me".
The authors reported an internal consistency (KuderRichardson 20 reliability) for the 20 items as .80 and .81.
Test-retest coefficient was .75 at a six-week interval.
They also reported discriminant validity from the locus of
control construct (r=-,19) with the Rotter I-E Scale and a
low correlation (r=.ll) with need for social approval as
measured by the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale.
A factor analysis yielded five factors: 1) general desire
for control; 2) decisiveness; 3) preparation-prevention
control; 4) avoidance of dependence; and 5) leadership, all
of which accounted for 55% of the variance.
3) 15 bi-polar adjectives - (see Appendix E) This
rating scale is standarly used by Lerner (Lerner, 1971a;
Lerner &< Simmons, 1966) to yield a measure of victim derogation0

Subjects rate „the "average female college student"

along a 9-point Likert-type scale with 15 highly evaluative
bi-polar adjective pairs.

This index of attractiveness has

a possible range of 15 to 1350

Subsequent ratings of the

victim on the same adjectives are subtracted from the first
rating to yield a comparative measure of derogation or
attractiveness.

These two ratings were used in the present

study as pre-post test measures of derogation.
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4) Multiple Affect Adjective Check List, Today Form (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) - (see Appendix G and H)
MAACL consists of 132 adjectives

The

scored on three subscales,

anxiety (21 items), depression (40 items), and hostility (28
items)j with remaining items as fillers.

Subjects are asked

to check all of the adjectives which describe their feelings
"Now-Today".

This form was designed to. measure self-reported

day to day affect or mood changes and instructions can be
adapted also for studies with repeated measures of mood change
(Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) as in the present study.

It has

been used recently in studies on learned helplessness and
control (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Gatchel, Paulus & Maples, 1975;
Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980).
Zuckerman, Lubin, Vogel and Valerius (1964) report splithalf reliability for a college population ranging from .79 to
.92 for the three scales.

A seven-day retest coefficient was

low (.15 to .21) as would be expected if measures reflect
transient mood change as intended.

In a similar population

these authors found high correlations between the three scales
(.72 to .75). However, validity data showed differential
effects on anxiety, depression and hosility scales in response
to different types of stress.
For ,the purposes of the present research, subjects were
instructed on the initial administration of the MAACL to
"describe how you feel nowV and after the experimental
manipulation instructions were given to answer the check
list by describing "how you feel after listening to the

page 56
audiotape".
5) Depression Adjective Check List (Lubin, 1967) (see Appendix F)

There are seven forms of the check

list, comprised of 32 to 34 adjectives scored in both positive and negative directions.

Internal consistency for

females on forms A, B, C, and D range from .85 to .88. Splithalf reliability coefficients for normal females for the
same forms range from .92 to .93.
bilities ranged from

t86

Alternate form

to .91 for females.

relia-

The ,

Today form of the DA.CL is proposed by Lubin (1967) as a
measure of transient depressive mood.

It has been used re-

cently (Raps, Reinhard & Seligman, 1980) in a learned help-.. .
lessness experiment as a repeated measure tapping mood changes
induced by helplessness training.

It has also been used

similarly by Kuiper (1978).
Lubin reports that the General form which taps "how
you feel in general" correlates more strongly (.42 to .55)
•with the MMPI Depression scale than the Today form, "how
you feel now - today" (.32 to .47), suggesting the Today
form measures more transient mood states.
Directions similar to those for the MAACL were used
with this scale (see Appendix F)

Forms C and D were admin.^

istered as pre-post measures of mood change.

Intercorrela-

tions for these two forms for normal females is reported by
Lubin as

091.

page 57
Dependent Measures
The primary dependent measures were scores on the
Depression Adjective Check List and Depression subscale
of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List which were
repeated measures.

A comparison of adjective ratings of the

"average female college student" and the victim yielded a
measure of relative derogation.

A measure of attributional

mediation was included with a 10-item scale constructed to
measure personal versus universal attributions for noncontingency.

Strength of expectation of future noncontingency

was also assessed.

Finally, a check was made on the mani-

pulations of involvement (instructional set), and credibility of the tape manipulation on a Likert-type scale.
Procedure
In the first week of the Winter Quarter, the Belief in
a Just World Scale and Desire for Control Scale were administered to males and females in introductory psychology courses
at the University of Montana.

They were asked to provide

demographic information such as name, age, year in college
and major.

Females were then recruited by phone from high,

medium and low thirds of the females1 distribution of scores
on the Belief in a Just World Scale.

Subjects on the

division between thirds were not contacted.

Each subject

was assigned randomly to either empathy or observer conditions
across all BJW levels and assigned a subject number which
was placed on the appropriate experimental packet.
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Packets contained either "observer" or "empathy" instructions.
Subjects in all experimental conditions were run
simultaneously in groups of 10 to 15 on the nights of
January 29 and February 2, 3, and 4 in 12 total experimental
sessions.

Both a male and female assistant were present for

all sessions and were blind to the experimental conditions
and hypotheses.

The assistants handed out packets according"

to a prepared list of matched names and assigned numbers.
The audiotape manipulation was held constant for all subjects
with instructional set varied within the experimental packets.
Subjects were instructed to fill out the experimental
packet until they reached STOP,at which time they would receive further instructions.

They completed the following

items: 1) a cover sheet which included a modified consent
form (see Appendix B), and information regarding age, sex,
year in college and college major; 2) a rating., of the
"average female college student" on 15 bi-polar adjectives;
3) Depression Adjective Check List; 4) Multiple Affect
Adjective Check List; Subjects read the cover story and
then reached STOP.

Wfoen all subjects were finished to this

point the experimental assistants asked them to turn to the
next page and read the instructional set, but to go no
further.

The tape was then played and afterwards subjects

were asked to complete fully the remainder of the experimental packet.
Post-measures included: 1) ratings of the "woman in the
audiotape" (victim) along 15 bi-polar adjectives; 2) DACL:*
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with instructions to rate their feelings "now after listening to the audiotape"; 3) MAACL with similar instructions;
4) attribution scale; 5) strength of expectation of future
noncontingency question; 6) expectation of future harm;
7) observer/empathic self-rated involvement; 8) general
subjective/objective bias; 9) credibility of the tape
manipulation; 10) previous experience with obscene phone
callers; and 11) subjects were asked finally, to write what
they felt the experimenter was trying to test.
Debriefing:

After each session subjects were debriefed

as a group regarding the general purpose of the experiment
and all questions were answered.

Subjects were informed that

this was not an actual case and that usually such phone
calls can be handled effectively by measures recommended
by the telephone company.

Subjects were asked to refrain

from discussing the results with other students who had not
yet participated.

Subjects were told some of the possible

benefits of the research and thanked for their participation.
A. summary of the findings of the study was sent to partici=
pants who were interested.

All students received experimental

credit for their participation.
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Data Anaysis
Results were analyzed by a 3 x 2 factorial analysis
of variance with repeated measures for three levels of
Belief in a Just World (high, medium and low) and two
levels of instructional set (observer/empathy).

The

Ullrich-Pitz ANOVA program was used to analyse the data
for derogation and mood measures.

Hypothesis 1 was tested

by the main effect for Just World factor levels and victim
derogation.

Support for Hypothesis 3 was tested by the

two factor interaction of Observer/Empathy x Pre-posttest
comparison for both depression measures.

Hypotheses 4

and 5 involved the three factor interaction for Observer/
Empathy x High, Medium and Low Just World x Pre-posttest
for depression measures.

19 subjects were randomly discarded

to achieve equal cell sizes of n=18 for the Ullrich-Pitz
program.
Hypotheses 2, 6, 7 and 8 were analyzed by correlational
methods.

Data analysis for Pearson correlations used the

Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) computer
program (1975).

Correlations were based on n=127, and

also broken down into observer group correlations (n=65)
and empathy group correlations (n=62)„

£age 61
CHAPTER III
Results
Manipulation Checks
Pilot data for the tape manipulation are summarized
in Table 1. A second tape was made after the initial pilot
work and was used in the study.

It received higher ratings

for believability (x=7.3, n=10) and credibility of the
woman's response (x=6.7, n-10) than the first tape (believability, x=6.8; credibility of woman's response, x=5.6j n=5).
In the actual study, mean credibility rating for the
tape manipulation was 7.06 (n=127) on a 9-point scale, with
higher scores indicating increased credibility.

Highly

significant increases in anxious, hostile and depressed
mood for all groups after exposure to the tape would
suggest that believability of the tape was sufficient
for involvement in the experimental situation.
Subjects rated their participation as observing or
empathizing along a 9-point continuum (observer=l, empathy=9).
Self-ratings correlated highly with actual group assignment
(r=.52, df=125, p_<.001).

A. t-test further indicated signi-

ficant differences between mean ratings of participation
for observer groups (x=2,85, n=54) and empathy groups
(x=5.35, n=54) (t=6.74, df=106, p<.001). Additional
correlational data indicated there was only a slight relationship between observer/empathy group assignment and general
preference for objective/subjective viewpoint (r=.06, df=125,
pj>.05) which further supports the effectiveness of the
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TABLE 1
Pilot Data - Tape Manipulation
Tape #1

(n=5)

X

1) This was a believable example of women who
receive a series of threatening phone calls.

6.8'

2) The policeman in the taped recording responded
to the woman in a similar way to how most policemen would respond.

6.8

3) This woman's response to the situation of receiving such threatening phone calls was
' •.--:-'.«:.-,"'..
realistic.
5.6
4) The audiotape you have just heard could be an
example of a recent interview in Missoula.

Tape #2

7.8

(n=10)

1) The audiotaped interview was a good example of
a woman receiving a series of threatening phone
calls.

7.3

2) The policeman in the audiotaped interview
responded to the woman in a similar way to how
most policemen would respond.

6.1

3) The woman in the audiotaped interview responded
to the situation of receiving such threatening
phone calls in a similar way to how most women
would respond.
6.7
4) The audiotape you have just heard could be
an example of a recent interview in Missoula.
*Likert-type scale l=Strongly Disagree
9=Strongly Agree

6.9
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instructional sets.

General objective/subjective preference

was unrelated to dependent measures of mood (see Tables 2,
3 and 4). For empathizers, however, subjective bias was
related to more universal attributions for helplessness
(r=.26, df=60, £<.05).
Dependent Measures
A Belief in a Just World (3 levels) by instructional
set (2 levels) by pre-post (2 levels) analysis of variance
was calculated for the adjective ratings and all mood
measures.

Summary data for the analyses of variance are

in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
Correlational analyses for total subjects and observer
and empathy groups are summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 4.
Derogation

(see Table 5)

Analysis of variance for pre-ratings of the "average
female college student" and a post-rating of the "woman in
the audiotape" (victim) along 15 bi-polar adjectives revealed
a significant main effect for derogation (F=8.43, df=1,102,
]D<.005). Overall, women rated the victim significantly lower
than initial ratings of the average female collefe student.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that high just world (HJW)
subjects would derogate more than low just world (LJW)
subjects.

The BJW x Pre-post interaction was in the predicted

direction but did not reach significance,(F=l.43, df=2,102,
£=V243).

;
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Hypothesis 2 predicted for observers that derogation
■would be positively related to strength of belief that
the unjust situation would continue in the future.

This

was confirmed (r=-.20, df=63, £<. 05), supporting the contention that derogation increased in severity as subjects
believed the phone calls would continue.

However, the

correlation accounted for only 4% of the variance and the
relationship cannot be considered a strong one.
Additional correlational evidence suggests further
that for observers (n=65), derogation was significantly related to personal attributions for helplessness (r=.24, df=63,
£<. 05) and conversely, universal attributions were associated
with more positive ratings of the victim. It must be kept
in mind, however, that this correlation
a small portion of the total variance.

accounted for only
This relationship

was not found to be significant for empathy groups.
Mood Measures
A 3 (BJW) x 2 (observer/empathy) x 2 (pre-post) analysis.
of variance was computed for scores on the Depression
Adjective. Check List (DACL) and three subscales of the
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL): depression
(D-MAACL), anxiety (A-MAACL) and hostility (H-MAACL).

There

were highly significant increases in affect after exposure
to the tape manipulation for all groups on all mood measures;
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Depression

(see Table 6)

ANOVA results for DACL scores showed significant main
effects for pre-post increases in depressed mood over all
levels of BJW and instructional set (F=34.98, df=l,102,
£><"• 00001).

The main effect for instructional set was also "

significant (F=4.89, df=1,102,

Empathizers exhibited

JD<.03).

greater depressed affect over both pre and post-^test measures
than did observers.
Hypothesis 3 predicted empathizers would exhibit greater
depressed mood change than observers.

The instructional set

x pre-post interaction, however, was nonsignificant (F=.03,
df=l,102,

JDX.86).

Thus, hypothesis 3 was not supported.

Hypotheses 4 and 5 predicted a 3-way interaction for
BJW x observer/empathy x pre-post, such that HJW empathizers
would exhibit more depressed mood change than LJW empathizers
(Hypothesis 4) and in contrast, LJW observers would display
greater change than HJW observers (Hypothesis 5).
prediction was not supported (F=.97, df=2,102,

This

JD=.62).

Thus,

pairwise comparisons were not necessary.
Somewhat similar findings were shown in the ANOVA
results for D-MAACL scores (Table 7). The main effect for
treatment was highly significant (F=56.32, df=l,102,
£<.000001). An exception, however, was the failure to replicate the observer/empathy main effect found for DACL scores
(F=1.23, df=l,l02, £=.27).

Thus, support for observer/

empathy differences in depressed mood is mixed.
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As found with DACL scores, the observer/empathy x
pre-post interaction (Hypothesis 3) was nonsignificant for
D-MAACL scores (F=.32, df=l,102, £=.58). Furthermore, the
BJW x 0/E x pre-post interaction (Hypotheses 4 and 5) were
not supported by ANOVA results (F=.53, df=2,102, £=.60) and
pairwise comparisons were not computed.
Examination of group means (Tables 6 and 7) show evidence
of a nonsignificant trend that low JW groups were more emotional generally over both pre-post measures.

This was a

consistent finding over all mood measures.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that within empathy conditions
a high degree of depressed mood at post-test would be positively related to strength of belief in future noncontingency.

No significant relationships were found between

these variables (DACL - r=-.14, df=60, £>. 05 ,• D-MAACL r=-.ll, df=60, £>.05).
Hypothesis 7 proposed that within empathy conditions
a high degree of depressed mood at post-test would be related
to attributions of personal helplessness.
supported by correlational data.

This was not

For DACL scores, in fact,

there was a significant correlation in the direction
opposite that of the prediction.

Increased depression

at post-test was related to universal attributions for
helplessness (r_=.25, df=60, £<.05) .

A similar correlation

for D-MAACL scores did not reach significance (r=.12, df=60,
£>.05).
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Anxiety

(see Table 8)

No specific hypotheses were made for anxiety measures.
ANOVA results revealed a marked pre-post increase in
anxiety (F=57.13, df=1,102, £<.000001).

There was also a

main effect for observer/empathy set (F=7.46, df=l,l02,
]DO01).indicating

that empathizers were more anxious overall

than observers.
The observer/empathy x pre-post interaction approached
significance (F=2.5, df=1,102, £=.113). Thus, there is some
suggestion that empathizers tended to become more anxious
than observers.
For observers, anxiety at post-test correlated negatively and significantly with strength of belief in future
noncontingency (r=-.23, df=63,

JDC.05).

Increased anxiety

was associated with belief that the woman would receive
fewer calls in the future, but, of course, the relationship
was too weak to be of practical significance.
Hostility

(see Table 9)

No specific hypotheses were made regarding hostility
scores.

However, it is of interest because of its inclusion

in previous research investigating observer/empathy differences in evaluation of a victim (Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974)
as well as learned helplessness and deprivation of control
studies (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Gatchel, Paulus & Maples,
1975; Pittman & Pittman, 1979).

Wortman and Brehm (1975)

have linked hostility theoretically to learned helplessness
phenomena and Lerner and Miller (1978) have suggested that
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a ^relationship may exist between hostility and derogation.
ANOVA results indicated a highly significant pre-post
main effect for increased hostile mood (F=95.69, df=1,102,
£<.000001).

There was a nonsignificant trend suggesting

that LJW subjects were more hostile overall than HJW (F=2.!10,
df_=2,102, £=.125).

Correlational evidence also points to

a relationship between LJW scores and increasedhostility
at post-test (r=-.21, df=125, £<£.01), although the magnitude
of the relationship is small.
The main effect for observer/empathy did not reach
significance (F=1.57, df=l,102, £=.21).
Desire for Control
Hypothesis 8 predicted a positive correlation between
Belief in a Just World and Desire for Control scores.

In

fact, a marginally significant negative correlation was
found (r=-,13, df=125, £=.07), suggesting there exists only
a minimal overlap between these two constructs.
Universal/Personal Attribution
Factor Analysis - (see Tables 10, 11 and 12) The
Personal versus Universal Attribution for Helplessness Scale
contains 10 items which pertain specifically to the situation
of the victimized woman in'the audiotape.

Five were worded

to describe personal attributions for the woman's helplessness, "Something about this person may have had to do with
why she was receiving threatening phone calls." Five items
were worded as universal attributions, "Women who receive
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these kinds of bothersome phone calls can't really do much
about them."

The full scale can be found in Appendix L•.

Data from 51 subjects in empathy conditions were used in
the factor analysis computations.
Five factors with eigenvalues greater than one were
computed from the correlational matrix (Table 10).
Seventy-seven percent of the total variance was removed by
these five factors.
(Table 12).

Rotated factor loadings were computed

If the absolute value of a loading in the

factor pattern was greater than

|.35| it was considered

salient.
Factor 1: This factor accounted for 22% of the variance
and consists

of four items which all load positively.

These items are worded such that they are attributions which
deal with effort and action on the woman's part in handling
the phone calls, endorsing the woman as trying as hard as
most people would have to discourage the caller.
Factor 2: This factor accounted for 15% of the total
variance.

The two items loading on this factor relate to

the average reaction to such a situation.

Endorsing that

the woman reacted more emotionally than most women was
inversely loaded, while the item "Everyone receives an
obscene phone call sooner or later'! was positively loaded.
Factor 3: This factor accounted for 13% of the total
variance.

The two items which loaded substantially were

related to the external control of the situation by the
caller.
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TABLE 10
Intercorrelations Among Test Items for Attribution Scale
Item

123456789

1
2
3

,12
-.22 -.11

4

.04

.54

.21

5

-.15,

.04

.10 -.08

6

.20

7

-.02

8

.24 -.07 -.02

.18

.40

.03

.39

.18

.20

.05

.20 -.05

.17

.15

.04

9

.01

.04 -.08

.10

.17 -.07

.32 -.41

10

.06

.51

.41

.08

.33

n=51

.18

.50

.05

.06 -.10
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TABLE 11
Universal/Personal Attribution Scale
Factor Loadings for Unrotated Principal Components
Factor
III

I

II

1

.141

-.303

-.664

-.124

-.073

2

.797

-.085

-.114

-.196

.174

3

.098

.165

.734

-.054

-.431

4

.689

.082

.220

-.520

.092

5

0185

.255

.230

.750

.337

6

.496

-.192

-.302

.570

-.388

7

.662

.403

-.038

.017

.227

8

.242

-.631

.267

.094

.576

9

.077

.844

-.329

-.030

.139

10

.784

-.124

.067

.104

-.409

2.537

1.522

1.371

10234

1.064

Item

Eigenvalue

Pet. of
Variance 25.37
n=51

15.22

13.71

IV

12.34

V

10.64
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TABLE 12
Universal/Personal Attribution Scale
Orthogonally Rotated Factor Loadings
Item

I

II

Factor
III

IV

V

Communal
h2

.-.623:k -.331

-.266

.57339

-.186

.019

-.236

.72461

-.014

.863

-.065

-.099

.76419

.861

-.037

.192

-.168

.036

.80899

5

-.028

-.010

.103

.892

-il47'

.82784

6

.025

-.024

-.172

.177

-.887

.84918

7

.664

.272

-.029

.351

-.121

.65307

8

.255

-.830

-.157

.273

.125

.86903

9

.200

.831

-.140

.259

.170

.84579

10

.501

-.079

.193

-.048

-.718

.81312

1

.066

-.003

2

.788

-.100

3

.067

4

Pet.
total
var.

21.698 14.741 13.278 12.356 15.219

Pet.
common
var.
28.072 19.072 17.178 15.986 19.690
Percent total variance removed by 5 factors

77.29

n=51
* Loadings greater than 1.35/were considered salient
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Factor 4 s Twelve percent of the total variance was
accounted for by this factor, although only one item which
related to the typicality of the crime loaded at all highly.
Factor 5: This factor accounted for 15% of the variance.
Two items loaded at opposite poles of this factor.

They

related to the personal responsibility of the victim
(personal attribution) in receiving the phone calls.
It would appear from the variety of factors found that
use of the attribution scale to tap the bipolar dimension
of personal/universal attributions as defined in Abramson,
Seligman and Teasdale (1978) is premature.

Furthermore,

such a scale may often need to be constructed for a particular experimental situation, as in this case, which may
hamper generalizability to other research settings.

It

should be noted, however, that Factor 1 does appear to tap
universally oriented items, while Factor 5 is oriented
towards more personal attributions.
Data Analysis - Attributional data yielded differential
results for observer and empathy groups.

For observers

(n=65) there was a positive correlation between universal
attributions and more positive ratings of the victim.
Conversely, strongest derogation was related to attributions
of personal helplessness (r=.24, df=63, p<.05) although this
correlation did not account for much of the variance. The
relationship was not significant for empathy conditions
(r=.13, df=60, £>.05).
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For empathy groups, there was a negative and significant correlation between BJW and attributions (r=-.29,
df_=60, £<.01) such that high JW subjects gave more personal
attributions.

For empathizers, women who had received calls

themselves made more universal attributions for helplessness (r=.24, df=60, JD<.05).

As reported previously,

increased depressed mood at post-test was significantly
related to univeral attributions for helplessness (r_=.25,
df=60, JD<.05) within empathy groups.
of the prediction of Hypothesis 7.

This is the converse
However, it must be

noted that all of these relationships are rather weak.
Strength of Belief in Future Noncontingency
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the amount of derogation
would be related to the degree to which observers believed
the victimization would continue in the future.

This was

supported (r=-.20, df=63, £<. 05) although the relationship
was a weak one. A small but significant relationship was
found for observers• strength of belief in

future noncon-

tingency and post-measures of anxiety (r=-.23, df=63, JD<",05)
and hostility (r=-.21, df=63, £<.05).

It is not clear

why increases in anxiety and hostility would be related to
the expectation of fewer calls in the future.

This rela-

tionship was not found for empathy groups.
For all subjects (n=127) there was a significant and
positive relationship between strength of belief in future
noncontingency and universal attributions (r=.19, df=125,
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£<.05) although this did not account for a large amount of
the variance.
As would be expected, expectation of future calls and
liklihood of physical harm were positively related (r=.32,
df=125, JD<.01). People who had received calls themselves
had a greater expectation of future noncontingency (r=.17,
df=125, JD<.05) although this relationship was weak.
Likelihood of Physical Harm
Rated likelihood of physical harm to the victim was
not correlated significantly with any of the dependent!
measures of nood.

Thus, expectations of violence did not

appear to have a biasing effect on dependent measures.
While it did not account for much of the variance, this
measure was correlated with derogation (r=-.17, df=125,
JD<C.05)

indicating derogation was associated somewhat with

expectation of future harm.
As previously mentioned, expectation of future calls
was significantly and positively related to expectation of
physical harm (r=32, df=125, JD<.05), accounting for about
10% of the variance.
Rated involvement
Rated involvement was substantially correlated with
observer/empathy group assignment (r=.52, df=125, p><.001)
supporting the effectiveness of the instructional sets.
For empathizers, ratings of empathic involvement were
significantly and positively correlated with univeral
attributions (r=.39, df=60, £<,001).

This is supportive of
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the tendency of actors to attribute situationally (universal)
rather than dispositionally (personal).
Notably9 self-ratings of empathic involvement for
all groups (n=127) were moderately correlated with dependent
measures of mood (DACL - r=.40, df=125, £<.01; D-MAACL r=.25, df=125, £<.01j A-MAACL - r=.34, df=125, £<.01j
H-MAACL - r=.29, df=125, £<.01).

These results suggest

that actual rated participation as empathizing may be more
salient to predictions than just examination of observer/
empathy group assignment.
for future research.

This is an important consideration

Much of the current empathy research,

has not included a check on the manipulation of empathic
involvement.
General Subjective/Objective Viewpoint
For empathizers,(n=62), subjective preference was
significantly related to attributions of universal helplessness (r=.26, df=605 £<.05) although this accounted for only
a small part of the variance.
Rated preference for general objective or subjective
point of view was not significantly correlated with any
other measures, suggesting that it was not a biasing factor.
Previous Experience with Obscene Calls
Seventy-two percent of the subjects reported having
received obscene phone calls personally.

Fifty percent

reported having a close friend or relative who had
received such calls (n=127).

Previous personal experience

was signif icantly, .,but not highly, negatively correlated
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■with post-measures of anxiety and depression (A-MAACL r=-.15, df=125, £<.05; D-MAACL - r=-.22, df=125, £<.01)
suggesting previous experience moderates to some extent
mood effects in this setting.

Previous personal experience

■was positively and significantly related to universal
attributions (r_=.20, df=125, JD<.05) and strength of belief
in future noncontingency (r_=.17, df=125, JD .05) although
these correlations accounted for little of the variance.
Having close friends who had received obscene phone
calls was positively correlated with general subjective
bias for empathizers (r=.30, df=60, JD<,01), but the relationship was not high.

For observers this measure was

positively related to expectation of physical harm (r_=..21,
df = 63, £<.05 and credibility of the tape manipulation
(r=.26, df=63, JD<.05). Again, though, the relationships
are not strong ones.
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CHAPTER IV
Discussion
Over all conditions highly significant increases in
anxious, hostile and depressed mood after exposure to the
experimental situation

were found, indicating that the

interview with the victim had a marked impact.

The experi-

mental manipulation, then, appeared to be both credible and
involving.
Expected differences between observers and empathizers
(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977) in the
amount of mood change were not found.

Amount of pre-posttest

mood change did not differentiate observers from empathizers.
Lack of clear observer/empathy differences in mood change
does not appear to be due to inadequate involvement on the
part of the empathizers, but more likely can be attributed
to the remarkable involvement (affect change) exhibited by
those subjects instructed to remain objective (observers),
i.e. both groups demonstrated increases in affect after
exposure to the tape.

In addition, self-rated empathic

involvement was more highly related to the amount of affect
at post-test than empathy instructional set assignment.
Previously found observer/empathy differences in
derogation, such that empathizers did not derogate the victim
(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Lerner & Matthew, 1967; Stokols
&< Schopler, 1973), were not replicated in the present study.
A highly significant derogation effect was found over all
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empathy and observer groups.

Interestingly, a replication

of this study (with minor modifications) was later run with
male subjects (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1)

and

also failed to find significant observer/empathy differences
in derogation, although overall there was a significant
trend for the victim to be rated more positively instead
of being derogated.

One explanation for the failure to

find observer/empathy differences in derogation may be that,
as previously noted, the observers reported mood changes
similar to empathizers, suggesting that the realism and
intensity of the manipulation may have obscured the expected
observer/empathy effects.
The derogation effect well-documented in the just world
literature.(Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner & Simmons, 1966;
Simons & Piliavin, 1972; Sorrentino & Hardy, 1973) was
found across all groups in the present study.

Furthermore,

for observers, derogation was significantly, although not
strongly, related to the extent to which subjects believed
the situation would continue in the future.

As previously

mentioned, data for a male population (Sturm, Means, Fox
& Retzlaff, Note 1) was contradictory, finding a significant
overall trend for increased positive ratings of the victim
as compared to the average female college student.

The

predicted differences in derogation for levels of belief
in a just world, that high just world subjects would
derogate more severely than low just world individuals,
was not supported in this research.

While data for both
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females and males (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1)
indicated that high just world persons rated the victim
more harshly,

this was not a significant finding.

Marked differences between males and females in the
derogation response suggest that the sex variable should
be examined to increase generalizability of just world
effects beyond the experimental laboratory to social situations which may involve both males' and females' responses
to innocent victims.
Lerner and Simmons (1966) justified the use of samesex observers and victims because "females would be more
i

likely than males to exhibit compassion - thus providing
the clearest test of the hypotheses" (footnote, p. 205),
and this has been followed by others in the just world paradigm (Apsler & Friedman, 1975;

Ciaidini, Kenrick & Hoerig,

1976; Schopler & Stokols, 1973).

However, more "compassion-

ate" reactions exhibited by males in the present paradigm
would call into question whether conclusions based solely
on same-sex designs are justified.
More recent empathy research (Aderman, Brehm & Katz,
1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977) has also avoided the admittedly
problematic interpretation of cross-sex empathy.
results from the present research suggest

However,

that important

effects may be overlooked if sex variables in observer/
empathy evaluations are not examined.

Thus, both just

world research and empathy research have generally ignored
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sex variables which may have importance.

Future research

should investigate empathy between sexes as well as for
same-sex subjects.

Furthermore, just world research should

examine reactions to male victims as well as female victims.
Hypothesized differences for levels of belief in a
just world on mood change measures failed to find support.
No significant differences were found between high, medium
and low just world groups for depression, anxiety or :./••.'.-!■.i.'i ii-hostility mood change measures.

An inspection of group

means for female subjects, however, reveals a consistent
order effect across mood measures, such that low just
world subjects reported greater anxiety, hostility and depression on both pre and post mood measures than high just
world subjects, or medium groups which fell in between.
Data from a similar study with males (Sturm, Means, Fox &
Retzlaff, Note 1) found significant main effects for levels
of belief in a just world on depression and hostility
measures, with low just world subjects exhibiting the
greatest depression and hostility.

With all of these results

ordered in the same direction, one can say with some confidence that low just world individuals overall rated themselves as more emotional than highs.
Hypotheses regarding differential observer/empathy
increases in depressed mood over levels of belief in a just
world were not supported.

It does not appear that high just

world individuals are more likely than low just world
individuals to become depressed when asked to empathize with
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a victim who is perceived to have little control over the
outcomes in a situation.
Although it was hypothesized that Belief in a Just
World scores and Desire for Control scores would be highly
related, the correlation was negative and nonsignificant.
This suggests that the need to believe that one "gets
what one deserves and deserves what one gets" is largely
unrelated to the control motivation as measured by the
Desire for Control scale.
All subjects exhibited an increase in depressed mood
after exposure to a noncontingent situation (tape manipulation) as would be predicted from the learned helplessness
model of depression (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 3,978).
However, support for the learned helplessness model was
mixed.
mood.

Subjects also showed increased anxious and hostile
All mood measures were highly correlated, suggesting

that there was little differential mood reaction.

Within

empathy conditions, contrary to prediction, a high degree of
depressed mood (DACL) at post-test was positively correlated
with universal rather than personal attributions for helplessness.

D-MAACL scores indicated a similar trend.

This evidence is admittedly weak, but it fails to support
the

proposed relationship between personal attributions

for helplessness and depressed affect (Abramson, Seligman &
Caution should be exercised in interpretation of attribution
scale scores. The first analysis of the scale in the present
research revealed five individual factors.
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Teasdale, 1978).

Furthermore, the hypothesized relationship

between strength of belief in future noncontingency and
depressed mood was not supported.
Beyond finding increases in depressed mood after exposure to an uncontrollable situation, these results are not
clearly supportive of the theoretical model of depression as
stated by Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978).

The

learned helplessness reformulation theorized that a belief
in future noncontingency and personal attributions for helplessness would lead to increased depression.
ships were not found, to be significant.

These relation-

However, these

measures in the present study alone do not constitute a
complete test of the new attributional model.
Data for the males (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1)
revealed a significant interaction for levels of belief in a
just world and pre-post measures of hostility, such that
low just world individuals exhibited greater increases in
hostile mood than high just world individuals. For females,
overall highly significant increases in hostility were found.
Such increases in hostility may be related to Wortman and
Brehm's (1975) reactance theory of depression which acknowledges that hostility may preceed the development of de-v; • •■•:
pression.

In a similar vein, Lerner and Miller (1978)

suggested that anger may be an initial stage'of the derogation process.

The interaction found between levels of

belief in a just world and hostility

suggests that further
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investigation of the connection between anger and derogation
is warranted.

Further examination of the specific inter-

action between depression and hostility within the learned
helplessness model is also necessary.
Two methodological notes should be mentioned.

First of

all, it is recommended that self-ratings of observer/empathy
involvement should be included in empathy research as a
check on the manipulation of instructional set.

In the

present study, self-ratings were more powerful correlates
of mood change than observer/empathy group assignment.
It may be that in future research, divisions of "observer"
and "empathizer" according to self-ratings of involvement
may give clearer results.
Secondly, although the present study used a manipulation
high in "realism",,no differences were found between high
just world and low just world believers in the derogation
effect.

In fact, in a similar study conducted with male

subjects (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1) the victim
tended to be rated more positively.

This pattern of results

is contradictory to findings in the just world literature
reported by Lerner and Miller (1978).

These findings suggest

that generalizing conclusions from laboratory settings
such as those

of Lerner in which "victims" are shocked

as part of a paired associate learning task, to real
world situations of victimization is questionable.

In

addition, experimental findings which do not examine both
sexes* reactions to a victim are limited.

Clearly,
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further research with more realistic examples of victimization is necessary.

Summary
The present study failed to find persons high in
belief in a just world more susceptible to depressed
mood when asked to empathize with a victim in an uncontrollable, or noncontingent, situation.
The expected observer/empathy differences in derogation,
that observersi would, derogate r.more than empathizers, was
not supported, although an overall derogation effect was
found.

There were no differences between high, medium

and low just world individuals in derogation of the victim,
failing to replicate previous research findings that high
just world individuals derogated innocent victims more
harshly than low just world individuals.

Important

male-female differences reported in the evaluation of
the victim clearly revealed a difference such that males
rated the victim more positively overall, while females
in all conditions derogated the victim,,

Thus, sex differ-

ences should be an important consideration in just world
and empathy research.
Highly significant increases in anxious, hostile and
depressed mood were found for all conditions after exposure
to a victim who receives a series of obscene phone calls
that she has little control over.

Yet, no differential
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mood reactions were found between observers or empathizers
or for different levels of belief in a just world.in response
to the example of victimization.
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REFERENCE NOTES
Note 1. Sturm, C.A., Means, J.R., Fox, S.G. & Retzlaff, P.D.
Male response to an innocent female victim as a
function of belief in a just world and observer versus empathy instructions. Paper presented at
the meetings of the Montana Psychological Association, Missoula, April, 1981.
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APPENDIX A
Transcript of Tape Manipulation
Policeman: Okay, just step in here, please. Have a seat
there I'll close the door. Now, the desk officer says you've
been having some problems with a telephone caller, right?
Woman: That's correct.
Policeman: Speak up a little please.
Woman: I probably should have reported this earlier, I don't
really what to say about it.
Policeman: Just tell me what's been going on.
Woman: Okay. I've been getting calls for over two weeks now.
Like I say, I would have done something at first, but I
didn't know it would be like this. I didn't know he would
keep calling.
Policeman: Yeah, how did it start?
Woman: I just got a call one night . It was really late and
when I answered it nobody was on the other end. I just
thought it was a wrong number.
Policeman: Yeah, sometimes they start like that.
Woman:- Well, a few nights later it happened again, that time
I couldn't hear a voice but I could hear breathing on the
other end. Not really heavy breathing like you hear in the
movies, but I knew there was somebody on the other end.
I said "Hello"-', they wouldn't answer me. I wasn't really
frightened, I figured it was just kids so I hung up.
Policeman: These guys like to get a reaction from you, how
soon did he call again?
Woman: He called back again that same night. I just let it
ring, I figured it was these damn kids. But I was laying
there and I got more and more angry so I decided to answer
it and really tell them off. But
well, when I answered
it, well, the caller, he was whispering something. I
couldn't understand what it was, but it frightened me. I
couldn't say anything at all, I just didn't know what to do.
Policemant Yeah, sometimes they just pick some girl's
number out of a phone book, and sometimes they just dial
at random till they get somebody0 But the thing that
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really frightens a -woman is when he knows their name.
Woman: Yeah, that is real scary, he does know my name. I
don't know if he knows me but he uses my name a lot.
After that scary call I left my phone off the hook for a few
nights. So he called me during the day. He was really mad,
he told me not to do it again, and kind of threatened me.....
Policeman: Is there anybody you know, somebody you're
acquainted with maybe that might do something like this.
Uh, like, oh, an old boyfriend, someone you met recently,
someone you do business with?
Woman: He doesn't sound familiar, I don't think I know him.
I do work part time as a waitress, I see a lot of people
there, I don't know, it could be someone there, I don't
know.
Policeman: Has the man said anything else to you?
Woman: Of course, a lot of sex stuff, pretty crude stuff,
and he talks about me and him together, and he mixes it in'
with all of this angry stuff, warns me not to tell anybody
about it, not to report it. I just don't know what to do—
he knows when I leave the house, he knows when I come back,
he says he knows where I go. The other night I came home,
and it was really late. I walked in the door and the phone
was ringing. Of course it was him, he started asking me all
these questions, "Did I have a good time", "What did I do"
"What did I like to do for entertainment".. I wanted to
hang up but I was really frightened. I had been out with a
man that night. The caller started....he doesn't want me
out with anyone else....like he's jealous or something.
Policeman: This guy sounds kind of like the same pattern that
happened a few months ago in that same area. But we didn't
locate that guy because it depends alot on where he's calling
frcm and how consistent his calls are. Now, you can help us
if you can describe his voice, what did he sound like, was
it muffled, or have an accent, or any background noise you
could recognize, a bar, or maybe it was a phone booth on
a street where you could hear cars.... or something...
Woman: Just muffled. Like he's trying to disguise his voice.
He talks* really slowly and uses a real low voice.
This is getting really hard for me to handle, yesterday
he called again, my girlfriend was over and she answered the
phone, so he started telling her all about it. He knows
when I go, when I come home, he started giving her messages
to tell me that I should be staying good for him. I don't
know what this guy wants...
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APPENDIX B
Experimental Packet Cover Sheet
The following psychological experiment involves listenint to taped interview material. You" will be asked to
complete questions relevant to this material. All responses
will be held confidential.
The benefits of this research will be discussed in a
debriefing session after the experiment at which time any
questions you may have will be answered fully.
I consent to participate in the following experiment
with the understanding that I am free to withdraw my
consent and discontinue at any time.

Signature
Please complete the following information:
Age
Sex

M

F

Year in college

Fr
So
Other

J

Sr

Grad

Academic major
Please complete the following pages of rating materials
until you reach STOP. The experimenter will give you further
instructions.
Read carefully and answer all items fully.
Thank you.
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APPENDIX C
Belief in a Just World Scale
Please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement
with all of the folio-wing items by circling the appropriate
number.
Disagree

Agree

1. I've found that a person rarely
deserves the reputation he has.

12

3

4

5

6

2. Basically, the world is a just
place.

12

3

4

5

6

3. People who get "lucky breaks'.' have
usually earned their good fortune.
1

2

4. Careful drivers are just as likely
to get hurt in traffic accidents as
careless ones.
12

3456

3

4

5

6
i

5. It is a common occurrence for a
guilty person to get off free in
American courts.

1

2

3

4

5

6

6. Students almost always deserve the
grades they receive in school.
12

3

4

5

6

7; Men who keep in shape have little
chance of suffering a heart attack.

2

3

4

5

6

8. The political candidate who sticks
up for his principles rarely gets
elected.
12

3

4

5

6

9. It is rare for an innocent man to
be wrongly sent to jail.

2

3

.4

5

6

10.In professional sports, many fouls
and infractions never get called by '
the referee.
12

3

4

5

6

11.By and large, people deserve what
they get.

12

3

4

5

6

12.When parents punish their children, it is almost always for good
reasons.

12

3

4

5

6

1

1
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APPENDIX C continued
Disagree
13. Good deeds often go unnoticed
and unrewarded.

Agree

12

3

4

5

6

14. Although evil men may hold political power for a while, in the general
course of history good wins out.
12

3

4

5

6

15. In almost any business or pro- :
fessions, people who do their job well'
rise to the top.
12

3

4

5

6

16. American parents tend to overlook
the things to be most admired in their
children.
12

3

4

5

6

17. It is often impossible for a
person to receive a fail trial in the
USA.

12

3

4

5

6

18. People who meet with misfortune
have often brought it on themselves.

12

3

4

5

6

19. Crime doesn't pay.

12

3

4

5

6

20. Many people suffer through absolutely no fault of their own.

12

3

4

5

6
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APPENDIX D
Desire for Control
Below you will find a series of statements. Please read
each statement carefully and respond to it by expressing
the extent to which you believe the statement applies to
you. For all items a response from 1 to 7 is required.
Use the number that best reflects your belief when the
scale is defined as follows:
1234-

The 'statement doesn't apply to me at all.
The statement usually doesn't apply to me.
Most often, the statement does not apply.
I am unsure about whether or not the statement
applies to me, or it applies to me about half
the time.
5- The statement applies more often than not.
6- The statement usually applies to me.
7- The statement always applies to me.

It is important that you respond to all items.
1. I prefer a job where i have a lot of control over
what I do and when I do it.
2. I enjoy political participation because I want to
have as much of a say in running a government as
possible.
3. I try to aboid situations where someone else tells
me what to do.
4. I would prefer to be a leader rather than a follower.
5. I enjoy being able to influence the actions of others.
6. I am careful to check everything on an automobile
before I leave for a long trip.
_7. Others usually know what is best for me.
8. I enjoy making my own decisions.
_9. I enjoy having control over my own destiny.
_10.I would rather someone else took over the leadership
role when I'm involved in a group project.
_11.I consider myself to be generally more capable of
handling situations than others are.
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APPENDIX D continued
_12. I'd rather run my own business and make my own
mistakes than listen to someone else's orders.
_13. I like to get a good idea of what a job is all
about before I begin.
14. When I see a problem I prefer to do something about
it rather than sit by and let it continue.
_15. When it comes to orders, I would rather give them
than receive them.
_16. I wish I could push many of life's daily decisions,
off on someone else.
17. When driving, I try to avoid putting myself in a
situation where I could be hurt by someone else's
mistake.
18. I prefer to avoid situations where someone else
has to tell me what it is I should be doing.
_19.' There are many situations in which I would prefer
only one choice rather than having to make a
decision.
20. I like to wait and see if someone else is going to
solve a problem so that I don't have to be bothered
by it.
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APPENDIX E
Bipolar Adjective Rating - Pretest
Please describe the average female college student along
the following adjectives. Circle a number for each pair.
1. intelligent
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

2. likable
1

3

4

5

6

7

2

unintelligent
8
9
8

unlikable
9

cooperative".7
8.....9

3. uncooperative
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

4. bossy
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

5. immature
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

easy going
9
mature
9

i

i

6. imaginative
1.....2

3

4

5

6

unimaginative
7. . . . .8
9

7. irresponsible
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8. nervous
1

3

4

5

6

7

9. patient
1

2
2

3

4

5

6

7

responsible
8
9
8

calm
9

impatient
8.....9

10.reasonable
1
2.....3.....4

5

6

unreasonable
7
8„ . . . .9

11.rigid
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

flexible
.8
9

12.courteous
1.....2

3

4

5

6

7

8

13.selfish
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

14.warm
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

7

insincere
8
9

15.sincere
1
.2

3

4

5

6

rude
9
unselfish
9
cold
9
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APPENDIX E continued
Bipolar Adjective Rating - Posttest
Please describe the woman in the audiotape along the
following adjectives. Circle a number for each pair.
1. intelligent
1
2
2. likable
1

unintelligent
8
9

3

4

5

6

7

2. ....3

4

5

6

7. ... .8

unlikable
9

3. uncooperative
1
2

3

4. ... .5

6

cooperative
7. ... .8... .. .9

4. bossy
1

2

3

4

5.

6

7

easy going
8
9

5. immature
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

6. imaginative
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

unimaginative
8
9

7

responsible
8
9

mature
9

7. irresponsible
1
2

3

4

5

6

8. nervous
1

2

3

4

5

6. ... .7

9. patient
1

2

3

4

5

6

impatient
7. . . . .8
9

10. reasonable
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

unreasonable
8
9

11. rigid ...
1
2

3

4

5

6. ... .7

flexible
8.....9

12. courteous
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

8

13. selfish
1
2

3

4

5

6

7

unselfish
8
9

14.. warm
1

3

4

5

6

7

8

3. ... .4

5

6

7

: insincere
8
9

2

15. sincere
1
2

8

calm
9

rude
9

cold
9
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APPENDIX F
Depression Adjective Check List - Form C
DIRECTIONS: Below you -will find words which describe different
kinds of moods and feelings. Check the words which describe
How YOU Feel- Now. Some, of the words may sound alike, but we
want you to check all the words that describe your feelings.
Work rapidly and check all of the words which describe how
you feel now at this time.

1.

Cheerless

17.

Buoyant

2.

Animated

18.

Tormented

3.

Blue

19.

Weak

4.

Lost

20.

Optimistic

5.

Dejected

21.

Low

6.

Healthy

22.

Deserted

7.

Discouraged

23.

Burdened

8.

Bad

24.

Wonderful

9.

Despondent

25.

Crushed

10.

Free

26.

Somber

11.

Despairing

27.

Interested

12.

Uneasy

28.

Joyless

13.

Peaceful

29.

Crestfallen

14.

Grim

30.

Lucky

15.

Distressed

31.

Chained

16.

Whole

32.

Pessimistic

APPENDIX F continued
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Depression Adjective Check List - Form D
DIRECTIONS: Below you will find words which describe different
kinds of moods and feelings. Check the words which describe
How You Feel Now - After Listening to the Audiotape. Some of
the words may sound alike, but we want you to check all the
words that describe your feelings. Work rapidly and check
all of the words which describe how you feel now after listening to the audiotape.

1.

Depressed

17.

Fit

2.

Elated

18.

Lonesome

3.

Awful

19.

Unloved

4.

Lifeless

20.

Glad

5.

Griefstricken

21.

Grave

6.

Inspired

22.

Sunk

7.

Woeful

23.

Shot

8.

Lonely

24.

Merry

9.

Suffering

25.

Wasted

10.

Mellow

26.

Washed Out

11.

Drooping

27.

Clear

12.

Rejected

28.

Gruesome

13.

Fortunate

29.

Tired

14.

Dreary

30.

High

15.

Lousy

31.

Worse

16.

Good

32.

Drained
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APPENDIX G
MA.ACL Instructions
Pretest
On the following sheet you will find words which describe
different kinds of moods and feelings. Mark an X in the
boxes beside the words which describe how you feel now.
Some of the words may sound alike, but we want you to
check all the words that describe your feelings. Work
rapidly.
Posttest
On the following sheet you will find words which describe
different kinds of moods and feelings. Mark an X in the
boxes beside the words which describe how you feel now after listening to the audiotape. Some of the words may
sound alike, but we want you to check all the words that
describe your feelings. Work rapidly.
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APPENDIX H
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List
1 □ active

45 Q fit

80

2 Q adventurous

46 O forlorn

90 □ pleased

3 □ affectionate

47 □ frank

91 □ pleasant

4 □ afraid

48 Dfrce

92 □ polite

5 □a^iUtr-d

49 □ friendly

9:«

C □agreeable

50 Q frightened

? O aggressive

51 Q furious

95

8 □alive

52 Qgay

9G

9 fj alone

53 Q gentle

97

10 □ amiable

54 Qglad

98 □ sad

11 □ amused

55 □ gloomy

12 Q angry.

56 □ good

100 □ satisfied

13 □ annoyed

57 □good-natured

101

14 □ awful

58 Qgrim

102 □ shaky

D

peaceful

□ powerful

94 i_i quiet
D reckless

99

D
D
D
D

rejected
rough
safe
secure

15 □bashful

59 □ happy

103 □ shy

1G □bitter

60 □ healthy

104

17 Qbluc

61 □ hopeless

105

18 □ bored

62 □ hostile

106

19 Qcalm

63 □ impatient

107

20 □ cautious

64 □ incensed

108

D
D
D
D
D
D
D

soothed
steady
stubborn
stormy
strong

21 □ cheerful

65 □ indignant

109

22 □ clean

60 Q inspired

110

23 □ complaining

67 □ interested

111

24 □ contented

6S □ irritated

25 □ contrary

69 □ jealous

□ sunk
112 □ sympathetic
113 □ tame

26 □ cool

70 □ joyful

114 □ tender

27 □ cooperative

71 □ kindly

115

28 □critical

72 □ lonely

11G

D
D

suffering
sullen

tense
terrible

29 □ cross

73 Olost

117 □ terrified

30 □ cruel

74 □ loving

118

31 □ daring

75 □ low

111) □ timid

32 □desperate

76 □ lucky

120 □ tormented

33 □destroyed

77 Q mad

121

34 □ devoted

78 □ mean

122 □ unhappy

D

thoughtful

□ understanding

35 □disagreeable

70 □meek

3C □ discontented

80 Q merry

37 □discouraged

81 Dmild

38 □ disgusted

82 □ miserable

39 □ displeased

□ unsociable
□ upset
12") □ vexed
12!i □ warn)

83 Q nervous

127

40 □energetic

84 □ obliging

12S □ wild

41 □enraged

85 □ offended

129

42 □enthusiastic

86 □ outraged

130

43 □ fearful

87 □ panicky ■

131

44 □fine

HS J~jpaiii-nl

r.j

123

124

D
D
D
D

n

whole
willful
wilted
worrying
y«»unc
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APPENDIX I
Cover Story

The following experiment deals with social observation
and impression formation.

Basically, people are likely to

be viewed differently by different persons.

These impressions

may be important in interview situations such as job interviews, business meetings or in everyday interpersonal
contact.
Psychological research has shown that people often
form impressions of others based on subtle emotional cues.
In a few minutes you will be listening to an actual example
of an interview with a woman.

You will be asked to pay

close attention to the emotional cues of the woman in
this situation.

STOP
GO NO FURTHER UNTIL INSTRUCTED BY THE EXPERIMENTER

APPENDIX J

Page
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Observer Instructions

The audiotape you will be listening to is a portion
of an actual interview that took place recently in Missoula.
As you listen, please attend carefully to everything the
•woman is saying., In particular, take note of her emotional
state and her reactions in this situation.

Be alert to

any changes in her speech, tone of voice, or her general
style of expression.
While you are listening, do not try to imagine how
you would feel in her place or how she may be feeling
inside.

Just monitor accurately what is happening.

page 123
APPENDIX K
Empathy Instructions
The audiotape you will be listening to is a portion
of an actual interview that took place recently in Missoula.
As you listen, please imagine how you would feel if you
were in the same situation as this woman.

Your job will

be to co-feel or empathize with her feelings and reactions.
Try to imagine how it would feel to be in this person's
shoes and how you would respond.
Do not try to sympathize or feel sorry for the
woman.

Just listen and keep clearly in mind that you are .

to let yourself react as if you were having the experience.

APPENDIX L
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Universal/Personal Attribution for Helplessness Scale
Please respond to the following items as they relate to
the situation you have just heard.
Indicate the degree
of your agreement or disagreement with each of the items
by circling the appropriate number.
1. Women who receive such phone
calls are usually chosen randomly
from the phone book0

Disagree
12345

2. Given the circumstances presented, 12
most people would have been able to
handle receiving these kind of phone
calls in a better way than this
woman did.

3

4

5

.Agree
b
7

6

7

3. In this type of situation, it
seems as if the threatening caller
has most of the control.

1234567

4. I would have had just as difficult a time handling such a caller
as the person on the audiotape had.

12

3

4

5

6

7

12

3

4

5

6

7

5. I think this woman received more
harassing phone calls than other
women to whom this has happened in
the past.

12

3

4

5

6

7

6. Something about this person may
have had to do with why she was
receiving threatening phone calls.

12

3

4

5

6

7

7. Women who receive these kinds of
bothersome phone calls can't really
do much about them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. This woman reacted more emotionally to the situation than most
people would have.

12

3

4

5

6

7

9. Everyone receives an obscene
phone call sooner or later.

12

3

4

5

6

7

10. I feel that this woman could
have tried harder to avoid receiving
more.calls.

12

3

4

5

6

7

page 125
APPENDIX M
Strength of expectation of future noncontinqency
1. How many more harassing phone calls do you thing this
woman will continue to receive after having reported
her problem? Circle the appropriate number,
none

1

2

3

4

5

6 or more

Likelihood of harm
2. How likely do you think it is that the caller will do
physical harm to the woman?
not likely
1
2 — 3

4

5

6

likely
7

Observer/empathy involvement
3. Please rate your participation on the following item:
I listened to how
I put myself
this woman reacted
in this woman's
in this situation
place during the
during the audiotape.
audiotape.
1 __ 2 — 3—4—5 — 6—7 — 8 — 9
General objective/subjective bias
4. If I were to read an article in the newspaper about
someone in a similar situation as this woman I would
generally: (check only one)
be more concerned with the facts
or :
consider the woman's point of view
Credibility
5. I feel this was a believable example of women who receive
a series of threatening phone calls.
No
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Yes
9

page 126
APPENDIX N
Previous Exposure to Obscene Phone Calls
Have you ever received any obscene phone calls? Yes

i'

No

If so, did they continue over a period of time?
How long did they continue, and how many phone calls
■were there?
Have you had any close relatives or friends who have
received a series of such phone calls?
Yes
If so, how long did they persist?

No

